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Introduction
In the fall of 2009, the New York Yankees claimed their 27th World Series title
with a team that oozed capitalism and free markets. With over $200 million committed in
its annual payroll, the Yankees capitalized on a strong free-agent class and some of the
best known players in the game to generate their first World Series title since 2000. The
feat was impressive, but the expectation in New York is always “championship or bust.”
The following season, the Yankees fell in the American League Championship Series to
the Texas Rangers who would go on to lose to the San Francisco Giants. The San
Francisco Giants were not the New York Yankees. They were not even close when it
came to payroll, star-power, and management. Yet this lovable bunch of losers took
control of the 2010 post-season and took home their first World Series since moving to
San Francisco.
This team was comprised of old and young players, but heavily reliant on its
young. Riding on the small shoulders of youngsters Tim Lincecum, Matt Cain, and
rookie Madison Bumgarner, the San Francisco Giants pitched their way into history.
What should be remembered about this team though is the fact that this team was thought
to be one of the worst run franchises in the league. While blessed with talented
youngsters, the San Francisco Giants were weighed down by some of the worst freeagent contracts in history. Barry Zito, who at the time of his signing, had the most
expensive contract for a pitcher in baseball history, did not throw a single pitch in the
post-season. Veteran Aaron Rowand had been offered to teams for practically nothing all
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season long, but no team would bite due to his inflated $11 million annual salary1. And
yet, in spite of having nearly a third of the team payroll committed to two insignificant
players, the San Francisco Giants were able to win a World Series because of their
talented, money-efficient, young roster.
The biggest trend in baseball now lies in the final trait above, youth. But it is a
stark change in management since the beginning of the past decade. Following the
success of the New York Yankees at the turn of the century, teams have begun spending
in greater amounts during free agency, which has resulted in greater investment in aging
players as a result of the most recent collective bargaining agreement. However, the
success of these investments is debatable. With bloated contracts such as Barry Zito’s and
with the success of such young players as Tim Lincecum, baseball appears to be seeing a
paradigm shift in managerial practices. Furthermore, the latest economic crisis has
resulted in a greater emphasis on financial responsibility for teams going forward.
Greater financial responsibility generally has always meant one thing: tighter budgets.
While this trimming of budgets seems to always be stressed every off-season, the
numbers seem to indicate otherwise. Free-agent spending has not dropped considerably
over the course of this decade when analyzing the most expensive contracts of freeagency.
In a brief analysis of free agency from 2006-2009, it was found that out of the
top-ten richest contracts awarded in each off-season, 17 of the total 40 top-ten contracts
were handed out by three teams (New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, Chicago Cubs).
Furthermore, out of the top-twenty players in each free agency class over the four year
1

"MLB Baseball Roster Analysis." ESPN.com, accessed February 16, 2011,
http://espn.go.com/mlb/stats/rosters.
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analysis, 43 players were signed by six teams (New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox,
Chicago Cubs, Philadelphia Phillies, LA Dodgers, and LA Angels) out of the possible 80
top-twenty players (see Appendix C). This data shows a clear disparity in the amount of
money spent by teams, and the type of spending habits that exist in baseball today. The
big market clubs spend the most during free-agency, and the small-market clubs must
rely on home-grown talent in order to compete.
Smaller market clubs are the teams that are expected to rely on in-house talent to
compete for championships. Because of the favorable conditions of a pre-free agent
player’s contract, small market teams are able to field a team of competitive talent for a
very affordable price. However, these teams almost always lose these young players as a
result of free-agency and their inability to compete with the money offered by the abovementioned big market organizations. With no salary cap to ensure a financial balance,
baseball exhibits a true free-market where money can be spent at any one team’s
discretion. While these smaller market clubs seem to be doomed to failure, several teams
have managed to be successful and competitive by managing their young talent
creatively. The most popular method for frugal teams to reach success is throughout
trades. By trading away talented pre-free-agent players, small market clubs are able to
acquire multiple players that can add depth to their organization. In example, the Oakland
Athletics organization has been known for this practice. Following the 2005 baseball
season, the Oakland A’s had three premier pitchers not one of which had reached his
free-agency eligibility. With the team already having lost their most talented hitters to
free-agency, management opted to trade away two of their three star pitchers in order to
acquire several players who would help them compete again in the future. Specifically,
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the team traded away two pitchers in separate transactions that netted them eight
prospects for the future. Such practices are commonly seen every year as players that are
near their free-agency period (typically at the end of that season or the next season) are
dealt for multiple prospects.
This endless cycle of rebuilding has yielded mixed results. Some teams, such as
the Oakland Athletics, have produced winning results. Other teams, including the
Pittsburgh Pirates, have remained in the lower echelon of the league. But of course,
baseball, like all sports is not just about winning: it is also about making money. Not
surprisingly, the big-market clubs are valued higher than small-market clubs in financial
value. The New York Yankees are valued at over $1 billion dollars thanks to not only
their $200+ million annual player payroll,2 but also because of their expensive stadium,
personal TV network, and merchandise/brand value. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the Yankees or any big-market club is highly profitable. With such high
operating costs, profit margins may not necessarily be what they appear to be. Therefore,
it may be possible that the most profitable teams are teams that rely on youth or perhaps
even a balance of youth and experience, at a reasonable price.
Management makes all of these actions happen. Every player that is signed to a
contract is reviewed by management. However, we see two prevailing styles of
management in existence today. On the one hand there are aggressive managers such as
the Yankees’ Brian Cashman. Year after year, the Yankees are the top players for the top
free-agents and top trade targets, but they are rarely recognized for developing young
prospects into successful players. Since the start of the past decade, the Yankees have
2

"2011 MLB Salaries by Team - USATODAY.com." USATODAY.com, accessed March, 31, 2011,
http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/baseball/mlb/salaries/team.
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brought up only one All-Star throughout their organization (Robinson Cano). During the
same decade the Yankees produced the most All-Stars, but only Cano was brought up
throughout the organization over the course of the decade. At the moment, it seems that
he may be the only one for several years since the Yankee pipeline has not shown
promising signs of new prospects. Instead, the Yankees have invested their time and
resources in acquiring talent that can make an impact on the following season as
evidenced by the fact that Yankees have paid for four of the five most expensive
baseball/sports contracts ever, all within the last decade. The Yankees are the extreme of
the “win-now” mentality, but there are several other teams that exhibit aggressive
transaction tactics.
The other side of the coin exists with small market teams who rely on building
teams in windows. These windows exist as short time-spans of a few seasons in which
the prospects of an organization are expected to peak together and allow the team to
perform at an elite level. However, these windows eventually close because of freeagency where these players will depart for more lucrative markets. The Tampa Bay Rays
are the most recent example of this window mentality. For the entire history of the Tampa
Bay Devil Rays/Rays organization, the team existed in the bottom echelon of the league.
However, in 2008, the team went from worst to first, making their first franchise playoff
appearance and eventually a World Series appearance. The team repeated its success in
2009 and 2010, posting winning records and achieving another post-season appearance in
2010. However, the team is already reaching a point of decline. All-star Carl Crawford
departed this off-season, and, over the past two seasons, the team has lost 6 different all-
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star players and core pieces contributing to their success.3 Furthermore, the simple truth
is that the team’s modest payroll of $42 million for 2011 will have prevented the team
from making any significant transactions to improve their team over the off-season. But
hope is not lost with the Tampa Bay Rays. Currently the Rays are ranked second in Keith
Law’s organizational rankings with eight prospects ranked among the top 100,4 and the
Rays are slated to have ten of the first sixty picks in the 2011 amateur draft,5 which
signals that the team will acquire even more talent. With such a great deal of talent, it is
not out of the question to see the Rays back in competition for a World Series in four to
five years.
The Tampa Bay Rays are expected to take a fall in the rankings this year, but no
one doubts that this team will return to prominence. The Yankees are expected to
compete once again for their 28th World Series title this season. The argument is that the
aggressive actions of big-market teams are always to win now, but how successful is this
strategy? Looking at the past decade of baseball, the Yankees have owned the most
expensive payroll for every year of the decade, which has yielded nine post-season
appearances and one World Series title. While one World Series has been perceived by
the media as a failure, post-season success is much less predictable than the regular
season. But the Yankees may be more of an exception than it seems. The New York Mets
possessed a comparable payroll to Yankees for much of the decade, but the team has only
appeared in the post-season and World Series once during the decade. The Chicago Cubs,
3

"MLB Baseball Roster Analysis."
Keith Law, February 28, 2011,"First MLB organizational rankings for 2011 have Kansas City Royals
predictably on top" http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/insider/news/story?page=2011MLBOrgRanks.
5
Bay News 9, April 14, 2011, "MLB set 2011 draft order and the Rays will be busy on day one,” Bay
News 9 . http://www.baynews9.com/article/sports/2011/april/232893/MLB-set-2011-draft-order-and-theRays-will-be-busy-on-day-one.
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White Sox, and Seattle Mariners have also consistently ranked as teams with expensive
payrolls, but, between the three clubs, only five post-season appearances have been made,
with only one World Series title. Money clearly has not equated success for these clubs,
especially with teams like the Oakland Athletics and Minnesota Twins appearing in more
post-seasons (eight) than the Mets, Cubs, and White Sox combined, and with both teams
showing payrolls averaging below $60 million each for the past decade.6
`

Today, top prospects are guarded with the most protection possible. In 2009, the

Philadelphia Phillies attempted to make a trade for All-Star pitcher, Roy Halladay from
the Toronto Blue Jays. The deal was ultimately unsuccessful because the Phillies refused
to part with their top pitching prospect, Kyle Drabek.7 Instead, the Phillies traded for
another All-Star pitcher, Cliff Lee, which did not require trading Kyle Drabek. While Lee
ended being a very successful addition to the Phillies in 2009, Roy Halladay was
considered to be the true prize of the trade market, and a favorite of the Phillies.
However, the Phillies felt that trading a prospect with no known track record of success at
the major league level was unreasonable, even if the prize was perennial All-Star and Cy
Young award contender. The New York Mets also refused to make a trade for Roy
Halladay by the same wisdom, with one Mets official being quoted saying the team was
trying to avoid, “mortgaging our future.”8 The Mets had clearly shifted their mentality
from just 18 months earlier when the team had traded away four prospects for similarly
touted All-Star Johan Santana from the Minnesota Twins.

6

ESPN. "MLB Baseball Free Agent Tracker ," ESPN.com, http://espn.go.com/mlb/freeagents (accessed
February 28, 2011).
7
Jon Heyman, "Phillies won't trade Kyle Drabek for Roy Halladay; Cliff Lee news." SI.com, July 21, 2009,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/jon_heyman/07/21/daily.scoop/index.html.
8
Heyman, “Phillies won’t trade Kyle Drabek for Roy Halladay; Cliff Lee news.”
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Such decisions seem controversial. But the fact is that winning teams are built
around a foundation of talented young players. The San Francisco Giants pitched their
way to the 2010 World Series because of a highly talented pitching staff that stayed with
the organization from their drafting to the World Series. Even the Giants’ offense was
anchored by a young, home-grown player, rookie Buster Posey. Posey was called up midseason and was the heart of the Giants offense from his debut. The Tampa Bay Rays and
Texas Rangers both made the postseason with two of the youngest teams in the league,
with an average age of 27.7 for both teams.9 Both teams were anchored by young,
talented players who were expected to carry the team in place of long-time veterans. As
the Rays exhibited though, such success takes time and patience.
The league even seems to support this belief as Major League Baseball is the only
sport of American sports where teams cannot trade draft picks, and its draft has more than
three times the number of rounds than all other American sports drafts combined. It is
also the only sport where teams are compensated for the loss of players with draft picks.
But this plethora of young talent is also encouraged by the league because of the
incredible disparity of wealth allowed between teams. It is not surprising to see that the
youngest teams also have the smallest payrolls. While conventional wisdom has told us
that it is unlikely that these low-paying, young teams can compete with the behemoths of
the large baseball markets, these teams compete every year for a trip to the postseason.
On the opposite side, the big-market teams are expected to compete year-in and
year-out, but we have seen large market teams like the Chicago Cubs not just fail once,
but almost yearly to make the postseason. Furthermore, the game of baseball is shifting
9

Data provided by, www.baseball-reference.com
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toward a more athletic game. It is a known fact that players lose reaction speed as they
age, which is directly related to bat speed. But the game of baseball is also shifting
toward a greater defensive focus, perhaps even to an unhealthy level.10 The “hot” stat of
the past few years has been UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating), which measures the skills
required for a player’s position and his total amount of area covered by his own personal
athleticism. The measurement of a player’s “zone” heavily favors younger players, as
older players tend to become slower with age.
All of the above seems to support the fact that younger players are becoming the
most valuable players in Major League Baseball. Free agency itself is recognized to be a
gamble, and, with the majority of top free-agents going to financial powerhouses, it is
even less likely that a star player can be acquired outside of an organization. Even the
New York Yankees have begun protecting their favorite youngsters, with their refusal to
trade prized youngsters Joba Chamberlain, Phil Hughes, and Jesus Montero. If the
Yankees believe it, then it is clear that the youth movement is here to stay.
This thesis is geared specifically toward investigating the valuing/over-valuing of
young players in baseball, and its effect on the game of baseball. Considering the
numerous variables that are debated toward the success of a baseball organization, it
seems necessary to try to discover the importance of these various factors toward the
success of an organization. In total, this thesis will analyze several covariates that are
currently disputed in their importance toward the success of a Major League Baseball
franchise, including youth. The analysis will incorporate both qualitative and quantitative
characteristics, and this thesis will look at their impact on an organization’s success both
10

Tim Marchman, "Did Red Sox, Mariners, White Sox go too far with defense?” May 13, 2010, SI.com,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/tim_marchman/05/13/run.prevention/index.html.
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on the baseball field and in financial profits. This thesis will also look into the origination
of the overvaluing of youth in baseball, and the causes of this overwhelming trend
throughout the baseball world. Finally, this thesis will also analyze select organizations
on a case-study basis. The purpose of each analysis will be to provide examples of the
specific conditions that have coincided with the covariates under analysis, as well as
exceptions and failures to the trends under analysis.
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Chapter 1: History of the Youth Movement
Steroids and Performance Enhancing Drugs
Following the 1995 strike season in baseball, the game struggled to return to its
previous prominence. Attendance lagged and the game lost its appeal.11 This all changed
in 1998 as baseball began its ascension to prominence on the backs of two big-time
sluggers: Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa. McGwire, who had slugged 58 homeruns the
prior season, began the season on a monstrous tear: 27 homeruns in the season’s first two
months. From the start of the season, McGwire seemed poised to break the single-season
home-run record. However, competition for the precious record emerged in June of 1998
when the relatively unknown Sammy Sosa slugged 20 homeruns in a single month to put
himself just behind Mark McGwire. The two continued their bout up until the season’s
end, when both broke Roger Maris’ single-season homerun record: Sosa finishing with
66 and McGwire with 70. The great homerun chase brought a new wave of interest and
excitement to baseball that had not been seen since before the strike. The two athletes
served as the new poster-boys of baseball.
The two new heroes also ended up becoming the poster-boys for a new era of
baseball: the Performance Enhancing Drug Era. During a post-game interview it was
discovered that Mark McGwire had been using androstenedione, a relatively unknown
drug at the time. “Andro” (as it is commonly known) eventually became not only an
illegal substance in baseball, but an illegal substance in the United States. The
supplement is chemically a step short of testosterone and is easily converted to

11

Mark Maske, "After the Strike, Baseball's Disgusted Fans Decide to Strike Back ." The Washington Post,
April 30, 1995. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-837033.html.
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testosterone when ingested. Andro was immediately identified by the media as a banned
supplement by stricter athletic-ruling bodies: the NCAA and the Olympics. But when
asked about the supplement, McGwire replied that “Everybody that I know in the game
uses the same stuff I do.”12 McGwire’s claim brought greater attention to steroids, which
would eventually come to haunt the game of baseball for the next decade.
Following Mark McGwire’s epic home-run season, a new era of power-hitting
seemed to emerge. From 1998-2005, an individual player has hit 50+ homeruns in a
season 14 times; the total number of 50+ homerun seasons in baseball history is 42.13
While McGwire may have been the beginning of the “Steroid Era,” he would ultimately
not become the face of the era. This honor belongs to Barry Bonds.
For much of his career Barry Bonds was considered by many to have been the
greatest player of his time. Bonds was the complete package on the field: he could hit for
average, power, steal bases, and play defense. But Bonds seemed to be hidden from the
spotlight despite all of his achievements. This changed during the 2001 baseball season.
Barry Bonds slugged 73 homeruns in 2001, and would later go on to 762 career
homeruns, which made him the single-season and career home-run king of baseball. But
such achievements were not without controversy. Bonds’ feats seemed supernatural. His
73 homerun season came at the age of 37; after turning 35 years-old, Barry Bonds hit 317
home-runs. 317 home-runs in 8 seasons accounted for 42% of Barry Bonds’ career homerun total over his 22 seasons. While power-spikes are common, it was unheard of to see a
man at the back-end of his career hitting for such power. This abnormality did not go

12

ESPN, "Who Knew?." ESPN.com. http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=steroids&num=8.
"Baseball-Reference.com - Major League Baseball Statistics and History." www.baseballreference.com.
13
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unnoticed. Despite his achievements, controversy and questioning followed Bonds
throughout the rest of his career. The evidence was claimed to have been everywhere.
Bonds’ physique had transformed in his later years as he had: his hair fell out, head size
increased, developed a great deal of acne, and had developed testicular abnormalities
according to the testimony of his mistress, Kristen Bell in his recent perjury trial.14
With the media discounting the many accomplishments of Barry Bonds, the fans
of baseball began screaming for drug-testing to ensure the purity of the sport. After
negotiating with the players union, Major League Baseball announced an experimental
testing phase in baseball. No results would be released from the test. Instead, the testing
was meant to indicate how many players in baseball would test positive for banned
substances (as indicated by other governing sports bodies) during the 2003 season. If
more than 5% of players tested positive, mandatory testing with punitive action would be
instituted. The names of players were to remain anonymous during this phase of testing.
The results indicated that between 5-7% of players tested positive for banned substances.
The first drug policy instituted was considered by many critics to be too light. The United
States Senate Commerce Committee eventually urged Major League Baseball to institute
a stricter punishment system than what it had in place. The resulting policy indicated 50game, 100-game, and lifetime suspensions for subsequent testing failures. The new
policy, which is still in practice today came into place for the 2006 Major League
Baseball season.15

14

Associated Press, March 29, 2011, "Barry Bonds trial: Ex-mistress says slugger blamed injury on
steroids." ESPN.com. http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=6266163.
15
"Drug Policy coverage." MLB.com. http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/news/drug_policy.jsp?content=timeline.
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Perhaps one of the greatest blows to the sport of baseball came in the infamous
Mitchell Report, which provided detailed histories of players who had used steroids in the
game of baseball. The report implicated several top players, and it provided the public
with the great depth of knowledge on the positive and negative effects of steroids within
the game of baseball. The findings of the report were not particularly shocking, but the
fact that the government had become so involved in the report indicated that changes and
transparency would be needed for baseball to move forward.
While steroids have gotten the most attention from the media, perhaps the most
important drug to be investigated in Major League Baseball, and which may be the real
source of the new youth movement, is amphetamines. Amphetamines have been rumored
to be in existence in baseball since the 1940s, perhaps earlier. But it is these “greenies”
that may actually be the source of baseball’s latest trend toward youth. The use of
amphetamines is well known. One can even argue that amphetamines are the reason that
WWII was won by the Allies, as pilots were heavily reliant on amphetamines to keep
them awake throughout long missions. Amphetamines are known to have similar effects
to cocaine. The physiological effects of amphetamines include: wakefulness, alertness,
decreased sense of fatigue, elevated of mood and confidence, and decreased appetite.16
Because of these known benefits, it is obvious that amphetamines are extremely
beneficial to a player during the course of a 162-game, six-month season. However, one
of the commonly unknown benefits and pitfalls of amphetamines is its ability to distort its
user’s perception of reality, as well as harming the user’s physical condition. This allows

16

"Drugs and Sports: Amphetamines." ESPN.com, accessed January 21, 2011,
http://espn.go.com/special/s/drugsandsports/amphet.html.
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players to push their bodies throughout injury, which can be both beneficial and harmful.
Amphetamines stay within the user’s system for a longer period of time than cocaine.
The main purpose and benefit of amphetamines in baseball is to aid players
throughout the grind of a 162-game season. Amphetamines provide its users with
sustained levels of focus and mental alertness. In a Sports Illustrated cover story, former
National League MVP Ken Caminiti provided a detailed outline of his use of steroids and
performance enhancing drugs throughout his career. With regards to amphetamines,
Caminiti spoke about their ability to get him energized for a game after a heavy night of
drinking saying, “"You take some pills, go out and run in the outfield, and you get the
blood flowing,"17 Current Texas Rangers Manager, Ron Washington, has also admitted to
using amphetamines during his career saying that, "Amphetamines were prevalent
throughout baseball."18 These benefits obviously seem to make a great deal of sense for
players who are beginning to show the signs of aging and are unable to recover quickly
from the previous day.
Because of their long history in baseball, the use of amphetamines has largely
been overlooked. This has changed with the latest drug testing policy instituted by major
league baseball for the 2006 season. Amphetamines now fall under the list of banned
substances. However, the punitive measures do not match the harshness of anabolic
steroids. Under the current performance enhancing drugs policy, players are put under

17

Tom Verducci, "Getting Amped." Sports Illustrated, June 3, 2002, accessed November 19, 2010,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1025905/index.htm.
18
ESPN, "Texas Rangers' Ron Washington said he used amphetamines and marijuana during his playing
days," accessed April 20, 2011, ESPN.com. http://sports.espn.go.com/dallas/mlb/news/story?id=5006406.
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investigation and expansive testing when testing positive for amphetamines.19 The
banning of amphetamines should be noted as an area of great importance when
evaluating the numbers of the post-steroid era in baseball especially when considering the
numbers of players past the age of 30. Currently, the numbers of players past their 30s
seem to be in decline.

The Effects of Drug Testing

Since baseball began drug testing the effects have been noticeable. Hitter statistics
have changed significantly since the institution of drug testing. More specifically, power
numbers have changed. From 1995 to 2005, the “peak” of the steroids era, Major League
Baseball had 40 players average a slugging percentage over .500.2021 Following the
institution of a formal drug policy, Major League Baseball saw that number drop to 31.22
It also possible that this number could continue to drop over the next ten years as more
data is collected. Furthermore, the total number of homeruns hit per season by the entire
league dropped. Beginning in 1995 baseball homeruns increased steadily from around
4,000 per a season to nearly 6,000. The average homerun total per season from 19952005 was 5,106 homeruns. Since 2006, though, homerun production has dropped to

19

Jake Emen, "Amphetamines: The True Culprit in Baseball," Associated Content, accessed October 6,
2010,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/319191/amphetamines_the_true_culprit_in_baseball.html?cat=71
20
Data obtained from www.fangraphs.com
21
Slugging percentage is a popular statistic used to measure the power hitting abilities of a player
22
www.fangraphs.com
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4,901. 23 While such drops may be coincidental, it is worth noting that such changes are
falling in line with steroid policies.
While power numbers have declined, it should also be noted that the overall
performance is also on the decline across the board in baseball. Looking at the best
players (as determined by Wins Above Replacement) in MLB throughout the first-half of
the past decade, when performance enhancing drugs were permitted, compared to the
second-half, when performance enhancing drugs were banned, the number of players in
the top 25 that were over the age of 30 were eight from 2001-2005 compared to five in
2006-2010. Of the five in 2006-2010, all five were listed in the previous half of the
decade.24 These signs indicate that there were no players over the age of 30 who emerged
to be among the best players in the league. Rather all players that were among the best in
the league over the age of 30 had already been established successful players. In
comparison, compared to the previous half decade (1996-2000), only two players
repeated as top performers in MLB past the age of 30. Of the eight players over the age
of 30 who performed the best from 2001-2005, the peak of the steroid era, only two of
those players had previously been among the best during the previous decade. This
evidence obviously cannot show that performance enhancing drugs were the direct cause
of such results, but it does show how rare it is for a player over the age of 30 to appear at
the top of the game without previously been labeled as one of the sport’s premier players.
In this post-steroid era, the ability to perform successfully at an elite level over the
age of 30 is incredibly rare. In the past baseball season alone there were very few elite,
single-season achievements accomplished by older players. In fact, the ability of any
23
24

www.baseball-reference.com
www.fangraphs.com
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player to achieve into his late 30s is considered to be nearly impossible. Consider that
over the past decade only two players over 35 to: hit 25 homeruns, drive in 100 RBIs,
maintain a season slugging percentage over .500, an on-base percentage over .400, and
make at least 400 plate appearances (roughly 125 games) are Barry Bonds and Manny
Ramirez.25 Of course, the two players have steroids and performance enhancing drugs
attached to their names, and their remarkable success seems to be just that: too
remarkable. On the other side of the diamond, pitchers have not fared any better. Within
the same age bracket, no pitcher over the age of 30 in the last decade has won 15 games
and had an ERA below 3.50. One pitcher has won 15 games (Derek Lowe), and one has
sustained an ERA below 3.50 (Andy Pettite).26 The late 30s are greatly feared in the post
steroid-era, but being on the hook for a contract into the late 30’s is even scarier.
With the banning of amphetamines, the expectation is that the performance of
older players will decline, which has been the case for the most part. However,
amphetamines are still in use in baseball, and it is a known fact to the public. Under the
new drug policy, there are exceptions to players who need medication that may break the
rules of the latest drug policy. The most notable exception has been in amphetamines
used to combat attention deficit disorder (ADD). Before amphetamines were banned in
baseball, only 28 players had filed for therapeutic exemptions. In 2010, 108 requests were
filed with Major League Baseball. All requests are made for exemptions from
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amphetamines to combat ADD.27 Furthermore, during the 2009 season 15 players tested
positive for stimulants. Of these 15, 13 tested positive for Adderall.28
The current estimate of the population that has been diagnosed with ADD varies
between 3-5%. 108 exemption claims places the baseball ADD population at almost 10%
of Major League Baseball.29 Such a discrepancy seems to be pointing toward abuse, and
it has been asked that the league further investigates the matter. However, such numbers
also show that amphetamines are considered to be a very important factor for many
players across the league.

A History of Free-Agency
The Major League Baseball Players Association has been a tremendous force for
the players. The original collective bargaining agreement made in 1968 raised minimum
player salaries from $6,000 to $10,000 and provided players with the right to arbitration
to settle grievances. Since then, the MLBPA has re-negotiated the CBA several times, but
the most significant contribution of the MLBPA has been its role in developing free
agency.
The reserve clause of Major League Baseball allowed teams to reserve the rights
to a player for year after his original contract expired. This was created initially to
prevent sheer capitalism from taking over the game and allowing the wealthiest teams to
purchase the best players. However, the reality of this clause was that it took away any
bargaining power from players. Players were left with two options at the end of their
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contract: either ask to be released from their contracts (which rarely occurred) or to hold
out until after their contract was completed and forfeit a year’s pay in the process.
Federal Baseball Club v. National League (259 U.S. 200 (1922)) was brought to
the Supreme Court to try and overturn the reserve clause. However, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of baseball. The Court stated that baseball was exempt from interstate
commerce because the game crossed state lines by mere incident, rather than
purposefully. Baseball would remain exempt from antitrust legislation for the next 55
years until the “Seitz decision” was passed, which effectively ended the reserve clause.30
While the “Seitz decision” brought the rise of the current free agency system, the
beginnings of such a movement originated with the Curt Flood. Flood was a standout
baseball player during his prime both defensively and offensively. During his career he
earned seven gold glove awards, batted over .300 six times, and helped his team win two
World Series titles as a member of the St. Louis Cardinals.31 After the 1969 baseball
season, Flood learned from a reporter that, without his knowledge, he was bring traded to
the Philadelphia Phillies, a terrible team at the time. Flood refused to accept the deal, and
wrote a letter to baseball commissioner at the time, Bowie Kuhn, asking to be declared a
free agent, which would have undermined the reserve clause. Kuhn rejected the request,
and Flood sued.
The case of Flood vs. Kuhn went to the Supreme Court where the court ultimately
ruled, once again, in favor of baseball. The Court acknowledged that baseball was indeed
interstate commerce unlike its Federal Baseball Club decision, but it still ruled against
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Flood and declared the case not a violation of anti-trust laws. And the Court urged
Congress to produce appropriate legislation. While Flood did not win the case, the
attention that the case caused would ultimately lead to the overturning of the reserve
clause. With the Supreme Court showing it would not rule in favor of the players, more
players and the general public became aware of the clause and more efforts were done to
try and overturn it. Following the National Labor Relations Board adoption of baseball to
be under its jurisdiction, the Seitz Decision was made. Andy Messersmith and Dave
McNally overturned the clause after both players played throughout their option year in
1975. Because both players had fulfilled their contracts, including the one-year reserve
clause stipulation, arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled that the two were free agents and able to
sign wherever they pleased. The following year, Major League Baseball adopted a new
agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association that allowed players with
six years experience to become free agents.32

Free Agency Today
The results of the Curt Flood case and the “Seitz decision” live on today. Today
free agency has become one of the most exciting aspects of the baseball season. And it
occurs after the season has ended. For many teams, a player’s year prior to free agency is
a difficult time. Teams are often faced with choosing either to lose the player at the end
of the season, or to trade the player before the season ends to be able to get something in
return. This is especially true for many small market franchises. The league has tried to
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counteract these difficult situations by setting up a system that compensates teams for the
loss of high-end talent to big-market clubs.
The current system of free agency compensation relies on using the amateur draft
to compensate teams. Currently there are three types of free agents: Type A, B, and C.
Type A free agents require the signing team to surrender its first round pick to the losing
team. Additionally, the losing team will receive a sandwich pick between the first and
second rounds of the amateur draft. However, if the team that signs the type A free agent
is drafting in the top half of the next season’s draft, they are exempt from giving up their
first round pick and instead must surrender their second-round pick. Type A free agents
are categorized as a player that falls into the top twenty percent of his position. Type B
free agents are in the next top twenty percent of their position. Signing teams do not have
to surrender a pick, but losing teams still receive a sandwich pick between rounds. Type
C free agents fall anywhere after type A and B free agents, and type C free-agents do not
require any compensation to the losing team.33

Recent Bad Contracts
It is worth noting that the worst contracts have signed during this time of great
inefficiency and lack of fiscal responsibility in baseball. Over the past decade 23 contacts
have been signed that have totaled over $100 million and six-years in length. Of those 23,
13 have been completed or in existence for over four seasons, which allows better
analysis. Of those thirteen, seven contracts have been shown to have at least as many

33

Keith Law, "Explaining Type A, B free agents - ESPN." ESPN.com, accessed November 30, 2010,
http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/blog?name=law_keith&id=2678840.

Youth in MLB 23
Figure 1 – Mega Contracts of the Decade

productive years as unproductive years (see below).34
Player
Alex Rodriguez
Manny Ramirez
Albert Pujols
Todd Helton
Jason Giambi
Derek Jeter
Carlos Beltran
Derek Lee
Kevin Brown
Ken Griffey Jr.
Mike Hampton
Alfonso Soriano
Barry Zito

Years
2001-2008
2001-2008
2004-2010
2003-2010
2002-2008
2001-2010
2005-2010
2007-2010
1999-2005
2000-2008
2001-2008
2007-2010
2007-2010

Productive seasons
8 of 8
8 of 8
7 of 7
5 of 8
5 of 8
5 of 10
3 of 6
2 of 4
3 of 7
2 of 9
0 of 8
0 of 4
0 of 4

Only three players have played out such contracts to 100% productivity: Alex Rodriguez
(2001-2008), Manny Ramirez (2001-2008), and Albert Pujols (2004-2010). [Productive
season = 400+ plate appearances, OPS+ of 125+, OR 20+ games started, and ERA+
125].35 Of all players in 50% or higher productivity range, not a single player is a pitcher.
In fact of the three pitchers who fit the sample size, only Kevin Brown has ever produced
a productive season.
Of the three above mentioned players Rodriguez and Pujols have been the most
productive, and both have ranked as the most valuable players in the league over the last
decade (based on Wins Above Replacement rankings). Ramirez has been productive as
well, but production has fallen off significantly for Ramirez since 2004, when he turned
32 years-old. Rodriguez and Pujols signed their large contracts at young ages (Rodriguez:
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25, Pujols: 24), and they have been able to not only be productive throughout their
contracts, but also benefit from being able to sign at least two major contracts in their
careers: once during their twenties and once more during their early 30s, which is still
within the typical peak range of players allowing them to demand contracts well over
$200 million.36
As mentioned previously, any player playing beyond the age of 35 should not be
expected to perform at an elite level. However, most players in MLB reach free agency at
ages ranging from 28-32. All players seek not only big annual contracts, but they also
seek long contracts with guaranteed incentives. In spite of the facts that players’
performance diminishes with age, teams continue to be generous towards the elderly.
Assistant GM of the Red Sox, Ben Cherington stated, “You’re basically paying a tariff at
the back end to get significant production in the early years.”37 While prime production
may be valuable, the price of paying for the back ends of these mega-contracts seems to
outweigh the benefits. As players continue to decline with so much money owed to them,
they become unusable assets. Most importantly, they become undesirable for the team
that owns their contract, and they become undesirable for any other team.
Of the contracts listed, only four players have been traded under their contracts.
Alex Rodriguez and Kevin Brown were traded to the Yankees, who were largely able to
make such trades because of their seemingly limitless budget, which was used to take on
the remaining amount of Rodriguez’s and Brown’s contracts. Manny Ramirez was traded
in the final year of his contract at the trade deadline, and he was traded at a time when he
was worth very little to most organizations due to his lack of effort for the Red Sox in his
36
37
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final days with the team. Mike Hampton was traded to the Atlanta Braves after two years
of poor performance with the Colorado Rockies. The move was largely made for
financial reasons as the Rockies were struggling as a franchise, and the trade could not
have been made without the Florida Marlins being a mediator and paying for $30 million
of Hampton’s remaining $90 million left on his contract. Such negotiations are rare, and
difficult to pull off unless they involve the New York Yankees. This list may grow in the
coming year as Carlos Beltran, Albert Pujols, and Todd Helton all enter their final years
of their massive contracts, but if they are traded it will have to be in exchange for less
than the contract is worth or with the ability to negotiate an extension with the player
before making the deal. However, Helton and Beltran have all seen tremendous declines
since signing their contracts, and likely will only be traded to a desperate contending
team, if at all.
Such contracts prevent teams from unloading these players, but they also play a
huge role in the ability of teams to upgrade their rosters throughout free agency. The
Houston Astros have been unable to upgrade their roster since their initial commitment to
Carlos Lee. Since signing Carlos Lee to his deal before the 2007 season, the Astros have
not made the post-season and have not signed a major free agent. Similarly, the St. Louis
Cardinals currently have been unable to re-sign Albert Pujols before his self-instituted
deadline, which means he will become a free-agent at the end of the 2011 season. The
failure to sign Pujols has been linked to an inability of the Cardinals to pay for his
contract, which is expected to at least surpass $250 million in total value with an annual
value of at least $25 million. This lack of funds has been linked to the Cardinals’ decision
to sign Matt Holliday to a 7-year, $120 million deal before the 2010 season. Currently,
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the Cardinals serve as the model of poor financial management throughout megacontracts, with over $72 million of the Cardinals’ $93 million payroll tied up in five
players.38 An extension for Pujols that would match the contract of Alex Rodriguez
would put those figures at $86 million of $107 million.
Of course the idea of such major contracts is that they should make the signing
team better. However, of these mega-contracts that have seen at least four-years of the
deal completed, only 4 of the players have played and won the World Series (Barry Zito
was left off the Giants’ playoff roster). Two of the players played on the same team
(Yankees), and only one of the listed players has won more than one (Manny Ramirez)
under their mega-contract. Without coincidence, none of the pitchers on the megacontract list have won a World Series or even pitched in a World Series game. The
chances of success for players of such mega-contract pitchers is nearly impossible to
predict, and, because starting pitchers do not play every day, their impact on a team’s
performance is much less noticeable than an everyday player. However, with only four
players winning World Series titles and only five players reaching the World Series
(Giambi), the purpose of these mega-contracts seems to be lost.
It is not only the mega-contracts that have been shown to be failures for Major
League teams either. As a whole, free agency deals seem to not have the desired impact
regardless of where the moves are made. Throughout an analysis of the top three-tiers of
the past four free-agency periods (2006-2009) of free agents (defined by the top contracts
in total value) the following was found39 40:

38

"MLB Baseball Roster Analysis." ESPN.com,
ESPN. "MLB Baseball Free Agent Tracker ."
40
Full lists can be seen in Appendix C
39

Youth in MLB 27

-

Only twenty out of a possible 120 players made an all-star team ever during their
contract period.

-

Only 9 of these all-stars came from the top-10 of their free-agency class

-

Of those twenty players only four were selected to multiple all-star games under
their contracts signed (Alex Rodriguez, Alfonso Soriano, Mariano Rivera,
Francisco Cordero).

-

All four of the players with multiple all-star appearances came from the top tier
of their free agency class.

-

Of the four multi-year, All-Stars: Rodriguez and Rivera are Hall-of-Fame
Candidates

-

The average top-tier total salary was $64,628,000 and 4.5 years, coming out to an
average, annual salary of $14,665,000

-

The average second-tier total salary was $18,381,000 and 2.5 years, coming out
to an average, annual salary of $7,427,000

-

Of the 40 top-tier players, 23 played on playoff teams … 21 from the second-tier

-

Teams with the most signings of top FA’s: Yankees (10), Red Sox (8), Cubs (7),
Phillies (6), Dodgers (6), Angels (6)

This means that in a free-agency period, there is a less than 17% chance that one of the
top 30 free-agents will be an all-star in the future, and it means that there is a less than
5% chance that a player signed via free agency will be selected to more than one all-star
team. And that if one is to sign a multi-year all-star; the signing will have to be made
throughout the top tier of free agency. But even then the odds of success are lower than
the numbers suggest. Two of the best free-agent signings from the top-tier have Hall-ofFame credentials, signaling that they are extraordinary players. Two of these four players
are also closers (defined as pitchers who primarily pitch in save situations), which is
widely considered to be one of the most volatile and easiest positions to fill. This means
that it is even less likely that one will be able to sign a “franchise” player throughout freeagency. Of the players from the top-two tiers, over half of them played for 6 clubs. Not
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coincidentally all six clubs have been ranked in the top-ten payrolls in baseball, and all
six clubs have been to the playoffs multiple times over the same time span.
As the saying goes, “the rich get richer.” It indeed seems to be the case
throughout the following analysis, but it also shows that these investments do not
necessarily pay-off in the ways that they were meant to. The likelihood of signing a
future all-star from the top-tier of free agency is 7.5%. Considering that the average toptier free agent makes over $14 million per season for, on average, 5 years is troubling for
any team making such an investment. Furthermore, these players are incredibly unlikely
to make more than one all-star team, which is all the more troubling for any team making
such a commitment to a player. However, the comforting factor for any team that gives
the most expensive contract of the off-season is that that player would go on to become
an all-star. While this data sample is small, it is exemplary of the spending habits that
have occurred in baseball recently. The graph in figure 2 shows that the spending habits
have dramatically changed in the 2009 off-season, but the 2010 off-season has put
baseball right back in line with its previous spending habits. Therefore, it seems that 2009
was more a result of a weak free-agent class than any type of shift in financial spending.
Figure 2 - Average Price of Free Agent Contracts
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The Advantages of Younger Players
Younger players come with two key advantages over their older counterparts: cost
and potential. Because of Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining agreement
players are not eligible for free agency until after six full seasons of major league service.
If a player’s contract runs out during this time period, he is allowed to re-negotiate his
contract with his team, but if a price cannot be agreed on, salary arbitration will be
instituted. Salary arbitration rulings generally work in favor of teams, but there have been
a few of cases of players who have broken the bank throughout salary arbitration.
However, the general consensus with top-level talent is to negotiate a contract throughout
arbitration years at a heavily discounted price. Typically, for a budding super-star, these
pre-free agency contracts generally are worth less than $30 million total over the course
of 4 – 5 years. For a lower caliber player, the price tag will come down. Such contracts
work in favor of management as teams are able to benefit off of reduced prices on
players, and players are forced to agree to terms as salary arbitration rarely rules in favor
of them.
With discounted prices, teams also gain a huge benefit from having players under
their control for six years. Because of the current collective bargaining agreement,
players cannot leave their team if they are tendered until they become free agent eligible.
This current model is especially preferable for teams that are low in financial resources.
The Oakland Athletics, Florida Marlins, and Tampa Bay Rays have served as models for
the past decades as organizations that have relied on young talent in order to build
competitive ball clubs. These young, talented players are rarely retained and re-signed
when they hit free-agency. In fact, of every all-star that each of the three teams above has
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had over the past decade, only one player has been given an extension guaranteed beyond
his arbitration years, Hanley Ramirez of the Florida Marlins. However, these three teams
have appeared in the playoffs seven times. The Florida Marlins won the 2003 World
Series, the Rays went to the 2008 World Series, and the Oakland A’s have appeared in
the post-season four times over the past decade. These three teams have also sat in the
bottom half of payrolls every season for the past decade.41 These teams serve as the
model of efficiency, and they have done so by emphasizing youth, and selling high on
players’ potential.
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Chapter 2 - Regression Analysis

To analyze the effects of the various variables mentioned previously, a multiple
regression analysis will be used across five separate variables. The independent variables
will be analyzed for the ability to predict the outcome variables of the study. The purpose
of the regression analysis is to analyze various variables and see how important they are
toward the financial and on-field success to a team.

Independent Variables
Age
The first variable that will be analyzed is the average age of major league teams.
Age is the most obvious indicator of the youth movement. Aside from being an indicator
of youth, age is also an indicator of the types of players that are signed to baseball
organizations. Because of the collective bargaining rules within baseball, a player must
have accumulated at least six years of service time on a Major League roster. The average
age of a rookie in Major League Baseball during the past decade was approximately 24
years of age. Under this average age, the average free agency eligible age for a player
over the last decade would correspond to being approximately 30 years of age. Therefore,
teams that are heavily reliant on acquisitions of free-agents will employ a higher average
age than that of teams that rely on prospects.
Under the current Major League Baseball rules, the active roster of a team is set at
25 players until September first of every season. On this date, teams can expand their
rosters up to 40 players for the active roster. However, for the purposes of this study, age
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data sets will be analyzed according to the opening day, 25-man rosters. The rationale for
this is that the increase to 40-man rosters almost always is done by the promotion of
minor league players to the major league club. Because minor league players tend to be
on the younger side of the age scale, the September call-ups tend to bring down the
average age of baseball teams. Furthermore, the original 25-man, opening day roster is
the core group of players that are expected to make it throughout the entire 162-game
season for a Major League club. This would imply that they are the most valuable to the
organization for their overall success, and, therefore, they will have the greatest impact
on the team’s success.
The average age of teams will be acquired using data from ESPN.com
Number of Players Acquired Throughout Free-Agency
While age can be an indicator of free-agent-eligible players, it is not a perfect
indicator. The age variable also takes into consideration the fact that age itself has its role
in success. However, the actual number of free-agent acquisitions on Major League
rosters can provide a more accurate indicator of the effect of free-agency. Also, not all
free-agents have to have served 6 years of playing time at the Major League level in order
to be eligible for free-agency. International players do not have to abide by the same rules
as American players. Players from foreign countries are granted free-agent rights
immediately upon their ability to enter the Major Leagues.
Different international baseball bodies have different rules for the transition to the
American game, but ultimately players from foreign countries can become eligible for
free-agency at a younger age than the typical American baseball player. An example of
this is players who come from the Domincan Republic and surrounding Caribbean
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region. Players such as Miguel Cabrera of the Detroit Tigers can be signed as free-agents
at as young as 16 years-old. After signing, these players can either come to America to
play in the American system (typically in the minors), or, more commonly, these players
will stay in the Caribbean to develop within their signing team’s own training facilities
until they are ready to play in American leagues.42 Across the Pacific, the ability to sign
foreign players is much more difficult. While the Caribbean is practically unregulated,
Asian baseball players typically require more financial investment. Because of the
existence of established, money-making professional leagues in Asia, Major League
teams must buy out the contract of a player from his Asian-league team. This process
typically operates like an auction, with the Asian team accepting the highest bid. From
there, a player is then given a short window to negotiate a contract with the Major League
team, and sign as a free-agent. The most expensive Asian player signed to a Major
League team was Daisuke Matsuzaka of the Seibu Lions in 2006. The rights to negotiate
with Matsuzaka were sold to the Boston Red Sox with a bid of $51.1 million (nearly
three times the Seibu Lions’ payroll that year), and Matsuzaka signed a contract with the
Red Sox worth a guaranteed $52 million in 2006.43 Matsuzaka’s signing with the Red
Sox is an extreme example of the negotiations that can take place with Asian teams,
which is generally why Asian players are not recruited at a high rate to Major League
Baseball.
Another exception can come with non-tendered free-agent players, who are
players that are ineligible for free-agency, but are not tendered contracts by their club
42
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after their contract has expired. This is rare, and is especially rare to see with star players.
However, the important thing to be noted in analyzing the number of free-agent
acquisitions is the fact that a team is choosing to acquire talent outside of its own
organization. Such a transaction shows that the organization was unable to find a better
player within their own organization, and they decided the best course of action would be
to sign a player from the outside of the organization.
Data for this variable was done throughout an analysis of player histories for
every player on a Major League opening day roster through baseball-reference.com and
ESPN.com.
Number of All-Star Players
The number of All-Stars on a single Major League Roster is indicative of the
quality of talent that exists on a team. These players also tend to be the players that can
demand the most money during free-agency. But this variable is under analysis primarily
to distinguish the importance of All-Star players on the ability for a team to be successful
financially and competitively. All-Stars are the players that teams will market behind and
use to sell tickets and merchandise. All-Stars are the players on a franchise who sell the
most jerseys, shirts, posters, etc. They are generally the most popular players of a
franchise, and they are generally perceived to be the most predictive of a team’s success.
However, as mentioned earlier, the quantity of All-Stars does not always indicate
the success of a team on the field. Therefore, this analysis can also help shed some light
on the importance of individual talents toward the success of a team.
However, there are some limitations to this variable. The first limitation is that the
Major League Baseball All-Star game requires that every team be represented in the
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game. This has resulted in some controversy as some teams that have been unsuccessful
must still have an All-Star on their team. Such a system has ultimately led to the
exclusion of statistically high-performing players for players that needed to be selected to
meet the game’s rules. Another limitation is the size of rosters for All-Star teams. As of
2010, All-Star game rosters got to be expanded to 33 players from the previous number
of 32. While this is a greater number than the active rosters of regular season teams of 25,
there have been complaints that the size of the roster leaves out many deserving
individuals.
Finally, the last limitation is that all starting position players of the All-Star game
are selected by fan vote, and not by their statistical performance. This voting system has
lead to statistically undeserving players getting to not only start the All-Star game, but
also be selected to the All-Star game. A popular example of this has been the selection of
Ichiro Suzuki to the American League All-Star game every year of his ten-year career.
While Ichiro has been deserving of this honor, he has been a leading vote-getter several
years because of his monopolization of the Japanese population both in the US and
abroad.
For the purposes of this study, All-Star data will only be extracted from the 2010
season, and not previous seasons. This is intended to control for the effect of a single
player receiving multiple All-Star selections, and, therefore, creating the illusion of
multiple All-Star players for a team. Also because the dependent variables are for the
2010 season, the “best” players of the 2010 season would theoretically be on the 2010
All-Star teams.
Number of Transactions per a Season
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This variable is intended to analyze the effect of managerial intervention on a
team from season-to-season and over the course of the season. Because of the differing
philosophies within baseball today, it is important to evaluate the efficacy of these
different ideologies.
The number of transactions per a season will include all transactions made over
the course of a season beginning at the end of the 2009 World Series to the beginning of
the 2011 Major League Baseball season. This time frame will include transactions that
occur both before and during the course of the 2010 baseball season, and the following
off-season. The inclusion of the winter of 2011 is to correspond with the data of operating
income, which incorporates the most recent off-season in its projections of Major League
Baseball finances.
A transaction will be defined as the trade of a player, the signing of player
throughout free agency, the claiming of a player through waivers, promotion of a player
from the minor leagues, and any other similar transactions that involve the acquisition of
a Major League level player. Minor league player acquisitions will not be included in this
variable except for those acquired throughout trades. This means that players selected in
the 2010 Major League Baseball Amateur Draft will not be included unless they made the
Major League team during the same season. The number of players involved in a trade
will not be counted toward the variable. All trades of players will be treated as a single
transaction as players are often traded in unbalanced numbers.
Transactions data will be acquired through the use of mlbtraderumors.com’s
transaction tracker tool.
Payroll
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Team payroll expresses the amount of financial investment placed in a team.
Theoretically, high payrolls should express the quality of talent that exists on a major
league team, which should, therefore, express the success of a team. Of course, this has
been shown to not always be the case. Team payrolls also can be indicative of the amount
and quality of free-agent talent on a team. The most talented free-agents demand the most
money, and therefore a larger payroll can be indicative of this. By the same logic,
payrolls are also indicative of a team that relies more heavily on younger talent, as a
lower payroll could indicate.
Payroll data has been acquired through USA Today.
Dependent Variables
Winning Percentage
Winning is the most obvious indicator of on-field success. The choice of winning
percentage lies in its ability to incorporate both wins and losses into a single statistic. In
general terms, a team is considered to be very successful if it is able to maintain a
winning percentage of at least .500. This means that a team that has won at least 50% of
its games is considered to be successful, by the general population of baseball observers.
However, Major League Baseball’s playoff system only incorporates eight total
teams from all of Major League Baseball’s 30 teams. In fact, for 2010, the lowest
winning percentage of a playoff team was .556 (Texas Rangers), which equals a record of
90 wins and 72 losses, or nine games over a 50% winning percentage. Therefore, it seems
unfair to assess a team’s success based solely on their playoff eligibility.
Operating Income
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The use of operating income is to show profit margins for Major League Baseball
teams. Revenue is a misleading and biased statistic that favors big market teams such as
the New York Yankees and New York Mets. Team value is also a biased indicator
because of various team assets that can lead to a high value (i.e. new stadiums) and the
location of team can also play a huge role on the value of an organization. Operating
income is defined by the following equation:
Operating Income = Gross Income – Operating Expenses – Depreciation
All earnings are calculated before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
In the case of a baseball organization, operating income will take into account total
revenues minus expenditures such as payroll expenses, stadium operating costs, etc.
All operating income figures will be taken from Forbes Magazine’s projections of
operating income before the 2011 Major League season. Forbes Magazine’s projections
are based off of the finances of Major League teams from the previous season (in this
case, 2010). This makes the 2011 projections correspond directly to the data that is being
collected on the 2010 season, and the projections incorporate the expenditures made by a
team in the off-season (i.e. free agent signings).
When considering the emphasis on youth and young talent, and the decline of
aging players, the expectation of the analysis is that age will have a negative relationship
with winning percentage. That is that younger teams will have higher winning
percentages than older teams. On the operating income, the expectation with age will be
that younger teams will also be more profitable. Meaning that age will also have a
negative relationship on profitability.
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The number of All-Stars on a team roster is expected to have a positive
relationship on team performance and profits. Star players are given that designation
because of their contributions to their team. Therefore it is almost intuitive to expect the
teams with the most All-Stars to perform the best. All-Stars are also among the most well
known players in addition to their success. This makes them the most marketable players,
and should make result in making their teams profitable.
The number of free-agent acquisitions on a roster is expected to play negatively
toward the winning percentage of a team. Multiple acquisitions throughout free-agency
imply that there is a weak prospect development system. While some teams can afford to
fill their team with highly successful free-agents, there are only a select few in each free
agency class. This means that the rest of the free-agents acquired will not be able to
perform for their team. Because of their lack of marketability and on-field success, it
seems unlikely to expect a positive relationship on team operating income.
At the management level, total number of transactions are expected also have a
negative impact on winning percentage. While higher caliber players may be acquired
throughout trades, the rarity of such transactions makes it unlikely that a high volume
will have a significant impact. Also because major transactions of star players generally
require prospects, who will not make an impact at the major league level, the positives of
a star player will be cancelled out.
Payroll is expected to have a positive impact on team winning percentage. While
there are some teams that are ultimately successful with modest payrolls, there are several
teams that are successful with high payrolls. Furthermore, there are several teams at the
bottom of the payroll pyramid who may eventually become competitive, but these teams
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are not ready to compete yet. Because of the concept of building teams in windows, not
all teams that have small payrolls can be expected to succeed at the same time. However,
payroll is hypothesized to have a negative impact on profitability. Because of the
significant costs of high payrolls, plus the costs of stadiums and other operating costs,
teams must generate a huge amount of revenue to cover their losses.
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Chapter 3 - Results
Based on the results from the regression analysis for the dependent variable of
winning percentage the following was found. Across all five variables of analysis the
total variance accounted for yielded an adjusted R-square value of .511. The number of
All-Star players significantly predicted winning percentage, ß = .705, t(24) = 4.490, p <
.01. This finding was not surprising as the best players in the league should make an
impact on team performance. Such a finding is more intuitive than anything. Age
displayed, ß = .351, t(24) = 2.248, p <.05. This finding was contradictory to the
predictions made at the beginning of the experiment. It was believed that youth would be
the key to success, but the results indicate that older players have a significant positive
impact on a team’s winning percentage. Finally, the last significant finding was within
the transactions variable, ß = -.313, t (24) = -2.164, p < .05. The more transactions made
by a team over the course of one year actually had a negative impact on the team’s
performance.44
When looking at the operating income dependent variable, the regression analysis
produced an adjusted r-sqaure value was -.029. This indicates that there is a great deal of
explanatory data missing from the model, which also indicates that the variables chosen
do not have any significant impact on the outcome variable (operational income). None
of the independent variables were significant at the .05 significance level. The results of
this variable analysis are not surprising though. Looking at the data for operational
income, the distribution is scattered across the board. The data for operational income
seems to indicate that other factors are at play besides the variables listed for analysis. An
44
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example of this is seeing a small market team like the Oakland A’s, who enjoyed modest
success in 2010 (winning percentage of .500), but play in one of the worst stadiums in
baseball. The A’s posted a very profitable season according to operational income at
$23.2 million, which was greater than some big market teams. The New York Mets
posted a negative operating income of - $6.2 million. The Atlanta Braves posted a
winning percentage of .562, had 10 more wins than the A’s, and made the playoffs, but
had an operating income of $22.2 million. 45
The results show that more analysis is required on the financial side of baseball,
and that there is still more variance to be accounted for within winning percentage. But
the financial side is the most intriguing because it shows that team performance seems to
have very little impact on team profitability, and the amount of money invested in a team
payroll also seems to not show profitability. The latter is particularly interesting because
bigger payrolls generally signify more generous owners, which has generally translated to
better ballpark experiences for fans.
The data was also analyzed throughout correlations between the independent
variables to investigate possible relationships between variables. Throughout the
correlation analysis of independent variables, significant correlations were found
between: age and payroll (.513), free agent acquisitions and payroll (.559), and number of
all-stars and payroll (.444). This data supports the previous assumptions made about
payroll and its effect on team management. Higher payrolls allow teams to purchase freeagent, All-Star, players, who are generally older. And, obviously, more acquisitions
yields more dollars spent on payroll.
45
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Chapter 4 - Discussion of Results
The use of the regression analysis was meant to evaluate various variables that
play economic roles in Major League Baseball team management. Looking at the
regression data for a team’s winning percentage, the five variables under analysis account
for just under 60% of the variance in team winning percentage. The most important
factors that played into this percentage were the number of all-stars present on a team, the
average age of the team, and team payroll.
The number of All-Stars present on a Major League roster played the most
significant role in determining the amount of variance in winning percentage. This
finding seems fairly logical. As All-Stars are selected based on their performance during
the season, it makes sense that the more All-Stars present on a team, the better the team
will perform on the field. For the 2010 baseball season, the teams that were the most
represented at the All-Star Game were: the New York Yankees (8), Atlanta Braves (6),
Boston Red Sox (6), and the Texas Rangers (6). All four teams performed at winning
percentages over .540, which translates to 87.48 wins over a 162-game season. Three of
these four teams made the playoffs during the 2010 season, with the Texas Rangers
making the World Series. If the data is expanded, one can see that twelve teams had 3 or
more players represented on an All-Star team in 2010. Of that twelve, ten teams had
winning percentages of .500 or higher, and six of the eight playoff teams fell in this
group. No playoff team made the post-season with only one All-Star on their roster.
There are some possible confounds with the use of All-Stars as a variable.
Because of the team nature of the sport, players can benefit from being surrounded by
other successful players. A recent of example of this came in 2009 when Matt Holliday
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began his season with Oakland A’s before being traded to the St. Louis Cardinals at the
mid-season trade deadline. Holliday was traded to the Oakland A’s after the 2008
baseball season, in which he made his third consecutive all-star team. However, upon
being traded to the Oakland A’s, Holliday’s production fell off. Oakland’s roster was
lackluster throughout the season. The team finished in the bottom half of the American
League in every offensive production category and the team finished with a record of 7587 and finishing in last place in the American League West. Holliday performed at
underwhelming levels and was not selected to the 2009 All-Star game. Upon his arrival
in St. Louis though, he returned to his perennial All-Star form. Despite playing in 30 less
games and having 111 fewer at-bats, Holliday out-performed his production in Oakland
in nearly every offensive category. The St. Louis Cardinals were in competition for the
playoffs when they acquired Holliday, and the team had an impressive roster of three AllStar players, two Cy Young Award finalists, and National League MVP, Albert Pujols.
The Oakland A’s sported a roster of overall mediocrity. The A’s had only one All-Star in
2009, closer Andrew Bailey, and the team had played itself out of playoff contention
before July 1st.
Figure 3 - Matt Holliday 2009 Stats46
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Another confound within this variable is that All-Star game starters are subjected
to fan vote and player vote. As mentioned earlier this allows a player to be selected to the
46
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All-Star game by popularity rather than production. This often occurs in instances where
a recognizable player plays for a strong baseball club. An example of this was the
selection of Jason Varitek to the 2008 All-Star game. Despite hitting .218 in the first half
and collecting more strikeouts than hits, Varitek made the All-Star team by the vote of his
peers. Varitek’s reputation from previous seasons as one of the best catchers in baseball
and catching for the Boston Red Sox, earned him the support and votes of his peers. But
his selection is widely considered to be one of the worst All-Star selections in recent
memory.47
As was also mentioned before, the mandatory requirement of every team having
an All-Star representative also creates a possibility of confounds. If such a rule were
eliminated, it is possible that the variance in winning percentage accounted for by the
number of All-Stars would be even greater.
Surprisingly, age had the opposite relationship to the variance in winning
percentage. It was hypothesized that younger ages would be a predictor of team winning
percentage, but it turned out to be the opposite. The older a team was, the better on-field
performance could be expected. The five oldest teams in Major League Baseball for the
2010 season were: the Philadelphia Phillies (30.67), Boston Red Sox (29.95), Toronto
Blue Jays (29.89), Houston Astros (29.79), and the New York Yankees (29.65). Four of
the five mentioned teams posted winning percentages over .500, with the Yankees and
Phillies making the postseason. The five youngest teams in Major League Baseball were:
the Pittsburgh Pirates (26.99), Florida Marlins (27.33), Texas Rangers (27.67), Tampa
Bay Rays (27.77), and the Arizona Diamondbacks (27.80). The Texas Rangers and
47
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Tampa Bay Rays both made the playoffs and entered the post-season. However, the
Pittsburgh Pirates were the worst team in baseball winning only 57 wins in 2010.
When looking at the average ages of these teams it can be seen that the average
age of the youngest teams in major league baseball all fall below the typical free-agency
starting period. This means that these teams have the fewest free-agent acquisitions of all
teams, which is supported by the fact that all five of the youngest teams had the fewest
free-agent acquisitions on their ball-clubs. Conversely, the oldest teams had almost twice
as many free-agent signees on their rosters. Furthermore, the youngest teams possessed
the cheapest payrolls while the oldest had the most expensive payrolls.48
These results indicate that the model of poor teams is to rely on younger talent,
not dip into the free-agency pool, and, if so, sign cheap free-agents and not top players.
This model of management is the most fiscally conservative method of action, unlike the
wealthy teams. These teams rely much less on their own talent development, and these
teams rely on free-agent players to build their rosters. This analysis also shows that this
method of business is the most successful style of management for on-field success, as
the oldest teams posted over 56 more combined wins than the youngest teams.
While some of the younger teams have been successful (Texas and Tampa Bay),
others have not (Pittsburgh and Arizona). These discouraging results show one of the
most important factors to note when looking at the value of young players; there is no
proof that they will be successful at the Major League Level. The Pittsburgh Pirates have
drafted in the top half of the draft every year for the past decade, drafting in the top ten
picks eight times. Going back further, the Pirates have drafted outside of the first half of
48
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the baseball draft once since 1993.49 This means that the team has had the opportunity to
draft the most talented players of the draft sixteen times. Of these prospects, not a single
player has made an All-Star game. Once again going further, looking at the top five picks
made the Pirates in every draft since 1993 (totaling 85 players), only two players drafted
by the Pirates have been All-Stars, and neither made an All-Star team as a member of the
Pirates. Comparatively, the Tampa Bay Rays have only drafted players since 1996, but
have produced three Major League players that made the All-Star team for the Rays.50
The Rays have also produced more major league level players in the same comparison
with 31 to the Pirates’ 23. The Rays have been very successful in their drafting and
player development process, and the Pirates can be considered to be abnormally bad with
their drafting and player development. However, the two teams’ opposite fates show how
much chance exists in the talent development process.
Finally, the results of payroll are not surprising when considering that throughout
the correlation analysis it was found that the number of all-stars on a team and payroll
exhibited a positive relationship of .444. All-Stars demand large salaries. While it was
shown earlier that the probability to sign an All-Star throughout free-agency is low,
especially a repeat All-Star, rich teams often times are able to retain their All-Star
players, preventing them from walking to free-agency. For example, Miguel Cabrera has
never been a free-agent because he was signed to a large extension by the Detroit Tigers
before he was eligible for free-agency. Cabrera will get to test free-agency for the first
time in 2016 when he is 32, which will be 14 years after he began his career. Joe Mauer
49
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also signed a major extension with the Minnesota Twins prior to the 2010 season, which
will prevent him from testing free agency until 2019.
When looking at operating income, it is clear that there is very little predictability
that is controlled by management and players. Player performance was shown to very
little impact on a team’s operational income. This finding was particularly surprising,
considering that team’s emphasize star players to market teams. Furthermore, under the
correlation analysis, winning percentage and operating income were shown to have a
very weak correlation (.059). This result indicates that there is little relationship between
on-field success and financial success. While surprising, these findings make sense when
looking at attendance data for 2010. Two of the bottom five teams in attendance
(Oakland and Toronto) performed with winning records in 2010 and, on average, filled
their ballparks to approximately 40% capacity. The New York Mets averaged 77.8%
capacity attendance despite a .488 winning percentage over 2010. 51 Ticket sales
typically account for at least 70% of team revenues. Without sales, teams cannot increase
their profit, which means that they cannot acquire greater talent throughout free-agency
or resigning existing talent.
A huge factor for teams at the bottom of attendance is not their performance, but
their stadiums. The Oakland A’s, Toronto Blue Jays, and Florida Marlins (who finished
one game below .500) play in three of the oldest stadiums in baseball. The Oakland
Coliseum is the oldest stadium in baseball that has not undergone serious renovations
(Dodger Stadium and Angel Stadium) or is not a historical landmark (Wrigley Field and
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Fenway Park).52 Dolphin Stadium (where the Marlins play) and the Oakland Coliseum
were ranked by Forbes Magazine as the two worst ballparks in baseball. On the opposite
side of the spectrum, the Yankees and Phillies play in two of the most popular parks,
which are also two of the newest baseball stadiums in the league. The New Yankee
Stadium is also the most expensive baseball park ever built at over $1 billion.53
The results leave us supporting the model of the big-market teams. The data
indicates that older, star-studded, wealthy teams perform the best on the field and, based
on the model of analysis, they perform the best in the profit margins as well. Such results
support the model of capitalism and free-market economies that baseball emphasizes. If a
team has an abundance of financial resources, they will be able to buy the best players via
free-agency, keep their top players throughout resigning, and they attract the most people
to their games, which keep their financial resources plentiful. Small-market teams need to
stick with their model of fiscal frugality and youth development. Some teams have
developed successful variations of this model (Oakland and Tampa Bay), but such a
model only gives a team windows of success. No team over the past decade has been able
to replicate the sustained success of the New York Yankees with such limited financial
resources.
Another hope for these small-market teams is the construction of a new ballpark.
This model has turned the Minnesota Twins from a small-market team to mid-sized
franchise. With the opening of Target Park in 2010, the Twins were able to up their
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payroll to $97.5 million from $65 million the year before.54 With the opening of Target
Park, the Twins signed All-Star catcher Joe Mauer to a $185 million contract extension,
the richest contract ever signed by a catcher. The Twins also generated an operating
income of $26.5 million in 2010, while upping their franchise value to an estimated $490
million (up $85 million from 2009).55 However, the A’s and Rays both currently are
struggling to gain enough support to fund new ballparks, in spite of their success. With
the current economic downturn and the struggling real estate markets, it seems unlikely
that either team will be able to begin build a new ballpark for several years.

Future Research
For future research, it is recommended that research be conducted to further
analyze the importance of ballparks toward the financial success and prosperity of
franchises. Future research should also be directed toward finding more meaningful
predictors toward the economic success of teams (operating income or other measures).
Such research will be invaluable toward the future of the business of Major League
Baseball.
Individual analysis of player performance and age, independent of team
performance, would be interesting to see the true value of young players within the
greater context of baseball. While the results of this analysis indicate that younger players
seem to be more useful as financial relief, future research may indicate otherwise.
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Finally, future analysis should be directed toward management itself. Future
research should focus on the characteristics that make management successful. Such
characteristics would include financial characteristics, but also personal qualities that
have allowed certain general managers to stay successful. It would be interesting to see
how management approaches player development as well. Such an analysis would
provide insight into why certain teams continuously produce excellent players and why
others seem to fail.
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Chapter 5 - Case Study: All-Star for Prospect Trades
No organization can be successful without successful players. These teams have
had several all-stars come throughout their organizations, and, as mentioned earlier, they
almost always leave the team during free-agency. But the business model of these
organizations is to let these players walk, or if possible, trade them before they hit freeagency. Under the current collective bargaining agreement, teams are compensated for
the loss of top players with draft picks. While the one-to-one addition system seems fair,
teams often times attempt to try to exchange star players for multiple prospects. Over the
past five seasons this trend has become increasingly frequent. Players that are on their
way to free-agency are often times flipped for prospects in one-for-three/four/five player
deals. These trades are often made to competing teams looking to try and add the missing
piece to the championship puzzle. However, the question is how successful is this
strategy? Teams that have gutted their farm systems for the prize of the trade market have
rarely become the winners of the baseball season.
C.C. Sabathia: Traded from the Cleveland Indians to the Milwaukee Brewers
CC Sabathia was traded from the Rangers to the Milwaukee Brewers during the
final season of his pre-free agency contract as the Brewers were preparing to make a run
at the post-season. Sabathia was electric in Milwaukee, posting a 10-1 record over 16
starts56 and pitching heroically on short rest for the final two weeks of the season.
Milwaukee made the post-season, but the Brewers were eliminated in the first round of
post-season play. Sabathia walked on to free-agency and signed with the New York
Yankees. Under the terms of the original trade, the Brewers dealt four prospects, one
56
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(Matt LaPorta) was ranked among the best prospects in baseball, to the Cleveland Indians
for Sabathia. LaPorta was the 7th overall pick of the 2007 amateur draft and will be 26
years old heading into this season. LaPorta’s career has hardly been of note. LaPorta has
yet to play in a full-season and has not come close to putting up noteworthy numbers.57
LaPorta still has time to develop into a good player, but the odds of success seem to
dwindling. The lack of success for LaPorta seems to indicate that the Indians have lost in
this deal. However, the Brewers may come out as the ultimate losers as they lost not only
the players they traded for Sabathia, but Sabathia himself in exchange for unproven,
unpredictable talent through compensation picks.
Johan Santana: Traded to the New York Mets from the Minnesota Twins
Johan Santana was once considered to be the unquestionable ace of Major League
Baseball. Santana burst onto the scene as a success at the age of 24 when he posted an
impressive 3.07 ERA, with an equally impressive 12-3 record for the Minnesota Twins in
2003. Following that season he would continue for four more seasons of pure dominance,
winning two Cy-Young Awards, leading the league in strikeouts three consecutive years
(2004-2006), averaging 17.5 wins, averaging 6.35 wins above the replacement level per
season,58 and capturing the Major League Pitching Triple Crown (leading the league in
wins, ERA, and strikeouts). In spite of his great success, the Minnesota Twins were still a
small-market team, with limited resources and a payroll of $71 million, and the Twins
elected to trade Santana before his final contract year in 2008.
The New York Mets outbid the Boston Red Sox and traded four prospects to the
Twins: Carlos Gomez, Phil Humber, Deolis Guerra, and Kevin Mulvey. The Mets were
57
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also able to sign Santana to an extension of six years and $137.5 million as a part of the
deal. The results of this trade are not encouraging for the Minnesota Twins. While the
Twins have still maintained a playoff competitive club, their sustained success has not
been the result of their haul from the Santana deal. Only Guerra is still with the Twins
organization, but he has not made it to the Major League level yet. In fact, only one
player (Gomez) has managed to spend an entire season at the Major League level. Of the
four players combined they have produced a combined Wins Above Replacement value
of 1.4 for 2010, and none of them are highly regarded for the future at this point. Santana
has gone on to pitch three seasons for the Mets. Santana has been overall a successful
pitcher, posting a Wins Above Replacement value of 4.8 over his three seasons.
However, Santana has been plagued with injury issues throughout his time with the Mets,
and he has had the dissatisfaction of playing for a struggling franchise in the New York
Mets, who have not made a post-season appearance since acquiring Santana. But the
results speak for themselves, Santana has been infinitely more valuable to the Mets than
any of the prospects that he was traded for.
Curt Schilling: Traded from the Arizona Diamondbacks to the Boston Red Sox
Curt Schilling’s career in Arizona had resulted in their World Series title in 2001,
but, following their title run, the Diamondbacks began regressing almost immediately.
With Schilling’s contract set to expire after the 2004 season, the Diamondbacks began
looking to trade the Cy-Young Award winner in exchange for talent to rebuild the club.
The Boston Red Sox stepped in and offered a package of pitchers: Jorge De La Rosa,
Brandon Lyon, Casey Fossum, and prospect Michael Goss.
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The Red Sox can be labeled the clear winners of this trade. Six years later, not a
single player involved in the trade is still with the Diamondbacks. De La Rosa has
developed into a promising pitcher, but he now pitches for the Colorado Rockies after a
series of dealings. Lyon would serve in the bullpen adequately, but never at an elite level.
Fossum and Goss can be labeled as busts. On the other hand, Curt Schilling would lead
the Red Sox to their first World Series title in 86 years in 2004, pitching heroically
throughout a serious ankle injury that bled throughout his sock during Game 2 of the
World Series. He would then go on to lead the Red Sox to another World Series title in
2007, sealing his Hall-of-Fame resume. Schilling will most likely be a first-ballot Hallof-Famer when his name comes up for election in 2012.
Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s: The Master Dealer
The Oakland A’s most famous member may be its general manager, Billy Beane.
Beane has set a new standard of managerial prowess as the Oakland A’s have been able
to be one of the most successful franchises in Major League Baseball, despite having a
payroll that has always fallen into the bottom-third of Major League clubs. The Oakland
A’s have made the post-season five times over the previous decade and compiled
winning records in eight seasons. The A’s are also well known for being the subject of
the national bestseller, Moneyball, which focused on the team’s unorthodox approach to
management and player evaluation.
Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s have been among the most successful teams of
this past decade because of their unorthodox approach and creativity. One of Beane’s was
most famous moves came when dealing away two-thirds of his prized “Big Three” for
prospects and continuing to compete. Oakland’s “Big Three” were pitchers Tim Hudson,
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Mark Mulder, and Barry Zito. All three were All-Stars multiple times during their tenure
with the A’s and perennial Cy-Young Award contenders. However, as free-agency lurked
with the three pitchers, the A’s looked to make the most of their assets.
Pitchers Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder were traded within 2 weeks of each other
before the start of the 2005 baseball season. Hudson’s trade ultimately did not create an
impressive return for the ace. The key piece of the trade, Dan Meyer, was eventually
waived by the A’s after failing to record a win at the Major League level. Hudson has
been a great success to the Atlanta Braves overall, averaging a Wins Above Replacement
value of 2.88 over six seasons.59 However, Mulder’s trade turned into a great success for
Oakland and colossal failure for the St. Louis Cardinals. Mulder’s trade produced two
future starters for the A’s: Daric Barton and Dan Haren. Haren would go on become an
All-Star with the A’s, and Barton is the team’s current starting first baseman. The
Cardinals got only 55 games out of Mulder over four seasons, which were plagued with
injuries. Despite numerous comeback attempts, Mulder has not played at the Major
League level since the 2008 season, essentially ending his career at only 30 years old.60
Haren would ultimately be traded to the Arizona Diamondbacks for six players.
Among the trade haul for Haren were Carlos Gonzalez and Brett Anderson. Carlos
Gonzalez would be used in a 2009 trade to acquire perennial All-Star Matt Holliday, but
has developed into a star after two seasons. Gonzalez finished third in the NL MVP
voting in 2010 and was awarded the Gold Glove for his position. Brett Anderson is the
current anchor of another deep, talented Oakland pitching staff that is expected to
59
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compete for another post-season berth. The Matt Holliday acquisition was intended to
give the A’s a trade chip for the mid-season trade deadline, which he did. The A’s once
again made a deal to acquire more prospects.
The lone remaining member of the original “Big Three,” Barry Zito was
unceremoniously let go and signed with the neighboring San Francisco Giants in 2008.
Zito signed the most expensive contract ever for a pitcher at 7-years worth at least $126
million. Zito has been a complete failure since his arrival in San Francisco, failing to
return to the All-Star game, and he was left off the Giants’ post-season roster during their
World Series title run in 2010.
Billy Beane and the A’s are frequent movers in the trade market. They have had
their successes and failures. But most importantly, they show to be the only team, of the
above-mentioned cases, that has been able to create successful trades for all-star players.
The trades of Mark Mulder and Dan Haren have been rare examples of the past decade
where a team has lost an all-star and replaced him with not even serviceable players, let
alone an all-star. The Schilling, Santana, and Sabathia deals can be looked at as major
losses to the teams that lost their super-stars. These also serve as examples of how youth
is over-valued more than it needs to be in baseball today. An all-star is a rare player to
have, and, as shown by the regression analysis, play a significant role in the on-field
success of an organization. Furthermore, despite being frugal, the operating income of a
team is still heavily reliant on the amount of financial investment made on a ball club.
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Chapter 6 - Final Thoughts
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the current management structures that
exist within baseball. Today youth is stressed so much, but, as this thesis has shown, it
appears that baseball today is truly over-valuing the potential of players. As shown by the
case study analysis and regression analysis, on-field success is best maintained
throughout the use of Major League-proven players. While their output may decline
throughout their 30s, their trajectory is more predictable than a minor league prospect.
Teams that have the opportunity to acquire an All-Star-caliber player throughout trade of
prospects should almost always take such deals. Simple statistics even emphasize this
fact. If only 68 players are selected to the All-Star game and 750 players are on opening
day rosters, less than 10% of players in Major League Baseball are “stars.” If we take into
consideration the fact that every team has to be represented and, as a result, a few players
are not statistically a superstar, which leaves an even smaller percentage of true stars.
Ten years ago, Baseball America ranked their top 100 prospects. Today, the top
100 players in baseball who were prospects in 2001 look very different. In total there
were 76 different players among the two lists, with 24 players being on both lists. This
means that only 24% of players in the top 100 from 2001 were ranked among the top 100
players ten years later (see Appendix E).61 Perennial All-Stars such as Hanley Ramirez
and Matt Holliday went unranked, while players like Corey Patterson, who today are
unknown to the common fan, were ranked at the top of the list. Some players have
crossed over between lists, but the results show that the future of prospects is uncertain.
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Such uncertainty makes it hard to compete with the guaranteed performance of a proven
Major League player.
However, there is a justified position for the stance of teams that have dealt away
their All-Stars. Financially, it makes the most sense for a team that is seemingly unable to
re-sign a player to deal him away for whatever prospects they can acquire. In the case of
these deals, teams must ask themselves if it is worth taking two first round draft picks or
possibly as many as five prospects. Such a proposition depends on the position of the
organization, and the timing of their windows. If a window or competitiveness is near, it
may be best to acquire prospects from a team in a trade, who are likely to be closer to the
Major League level than throughout the draft. It is also easier to predict a career
trajectory of a player with more data, which favors minor league prospects.
Another justification for trading away All-Stars is that, based on the model of
analysis, a team will need at least two All-Stars to be seriously competitive. Seventeen
out of twenty-one teams with two or more All-Stars produced winning records. No team
with one All-Star produced a winning record in baseball last year. And no team with one
All-Star had a better record than any team with multiple All-Stars. The failure of these
teams can be tied to the fact that they simply do not even have a player of All-Star
caliber, and was selected by mandatory representation. Two All-Stars eliminates the
mandatory requirement, which can be interpreted to mean that a team with two or more
All-Stars truly has two of the best players in baseball.
Without two All-Star caliber players, it seems very unlikely that a team can
compete. However, it is difficult to even pinpoint who will be among the best in the
league from year-to-year. In analyzing the 2009 and 2010 baseball seasons, it was found
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that 24 of the top-50 players in Wins Above Replacement value from 2009 were also
ranked in the top-50 the following season, with only two players repeating top-ten
performances (Evan Longoria and Albert Pujols).62 Nearly fifty percent odds are not
encouraging, but they are not discouraging either. Furthermore, the career successes of
many of these players were not predicted originally, as shown in the analysis of Baseball
America’s top-100 prospects.
While this model of analysis supports the actions of such teams as the New York
Yankees, there is still a tremendous financial risk to signing players to long-term deals
out of free-agency. Repeat success out of free-agency is rare, and it is a huge financial
risk to sign players to maximum deals with the expectation that they will decline as their
careers progress. Such tactics are inefficient for any team model, and they leave teams
committed to a player. And in some cases teams are left with a very expensive bench
player. However, in a sport where reaching base forty-percent of the time is considered to
be an excellent accomplishment, perhaps these teams are in the right. Some elite
production is better than no time of elite production. And the quickest, safest way to
acquire elite production is to select players with a history of elite production at the Major
League level. Prospects take time to develop, and, even then, there are no guarantees that
they will meet their expectations. Fans are impatient. No one wants to be told to wait
until the next season. But without the capital to invest in such players, a team has no
choice but to play the waiting game. It may not be as glamorous or as financially
profitable as the other side of the spectrum, but it is the method that many teams live by
today.
62
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The state of Major League Baseball as a league today is similar to the game itself.
Teams experience streaks both positive and negative. With the exception of a select few
teams, the majority of teams will experience momentary success before they decline
toward the cellar. Similarly players have their ups and downs, and, with the exception of
a select few players, players will eventually decline from prominence. Such is the cycle
of life as well. But in a sport where not making an out 40 percent of the time is
considered to be excellent, reaching the playoffs three to four times in a decade cannot be
considered a failure. For some franchises, that is all that they can hope for. These
franchises live on hope and chance. They hope that their cheap, youth is talented enough,
and that their potential for greatness will have a chance to compete with consistent,
proven, well-paid veterans. It seems unfair, and it probably is. But every day we hear of
the success of an individual beating the odds of the system and achieving greatness.
Teams like the San Francisco Giants remind us of the American values of hard work and
persistence, and that anything is possible.

Appendix A
Independent Variables
Team

Age

FA/Team

AllStars

Trans/Team

Payroll

2010 Winning Pct

Op. Income*

Wins

NYY

29.648

14

8

27

206,333,389.00

.586

25.7

95

BOS

29.946

9

6

43

162,447,333.00

.549

-1.1

89

ATL

27.888

11

6

24

84,423,666.00

.562

22.2

91

TEX

27.671

5

6

28

55,250,544.00

.556

22.6

90

STL

28.315

10

5

15

93,540,751.00

.531

19.8

86

LAD

29.463

12

4

42

95,358,016.00

.494

32.8

80

TBR

27.768

5

4

25

71,923,471.00

.593

6.8

96

CIN

29.156

8

4

17

71,761,542.00

.562

20.1

91

PHI

30.667

12

3

30

141,928,379.00

.599

8.9

97

DET

28.865

8

3

14

122,864,928.00

.500

-29.1

81

MIL

28.005

11

3

24

81,108,278.00

.475

12.4

77

TOR

29.882

9

3

36

62,234,000.00

.525

3.6

85

NYM

27.833

17

2

30

134,422,942.00

.488

-6.2

79

CHW

29.625

8

2

16

105,530,000.00

.543

27.6

88

LAA

29.103

8

2

14

104,963,866.00

.494

11.8

80

SFG

28.715

14

2

22

98,641,333.00

.568

29.9

92

MIN

28.294

6

2

16

97,559,166.00

.580

26.5

94

COL

28.636

9

2

15

.512

16.3

83

84,227,000.00
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FLA

27.331

6

2

22

57,034,719.00

.494

20.2

80

OAK

28.235

6

2

31

51,654,900.00

.500

23.2

81

SDP

29.548

6

2

17

37,799,300.00

.556

37.2

90

CHC

29.028

12

1

17

146,609,000.00

.463

23.4

75

HOU

29.789

14

1

37

92,355,500.00

.469

14.4

76

SEA

28.735

9

1

30

86,510,000.00

.377

9.9

61

BAL

28.957

8

1

17

81,612,500.00

.407

25.5

66

KCR

29.006

8

1

30

71,405,210.00

.414

10.3

67

WSN

28.067

12

1

31

61,400,000.00

.426

36.6

69

CLE

28.057

8

1

25

61,203,966.00

.426

12.1

69

ARI

27.804

9

1

22

60,718,166.00

.401

6.2

65

PIT
MLB
Avg

26.99

8

1

34

34,943,000.00

.352

24.6

57

28.701

9

3

25

.500

16.473

81

* in millions of dollars

90,592,162
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Multiple Regression Analysis
DV: Operating Income

Model Summary
Model
R
d

i

m

e

n

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

.351

a

.123

.092

.064750

2

.368

b

.135

.071

.065470

3

.718

c

.516

.460

.049929

.590

.524

.046855

.595

.511

.047518

1

4

.768

d

5

.771

e

s

i

o

n

0

a. Predictors: (Constant), Age
b. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA
c. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS
d. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions
e. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions, Payroll
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Multiple Regression Analysis
DV: Operating Income

Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients
B

1

(Constant)

3

4

5

Standardized Coefficients

Std. Error

t

Beta

-.276

.392

.027

.014

-.316

.401

Age

.029

.014

FA

-.003

.004

(Constant)

-.174

.308

Age

.022

.011

FA

-.003

AS

Sig.
-.705

.487

1.981

.057

-.786

.439

.380

2.053

.050

-.115

-.622

.539

-.566

.577

.289

2.029

.053

.003

-.128

-.907

.373

.023

.005

.624

4.519

.000

-.178

.289

-.617

.543

Age

.024

.010

.308

2.302

.030

FA

-.001

.003

-.054

-.391

.699

AS

.024

.005

.658

5.040

.000

Transactions

-.002

.001

-.287

-2.127

.043

(Constant)

-.266

.333

-.799

.432

Age

.027

.012

.351

2.248

.034

FA

.000

.004

.007

.039

.969

AS

.026

.006

.705

4.490

.000

-.003

.001

-.313

-2.164

.041

-2.114E-10

.000

-.119

-.554

.585

Age
2

a

(Constant)

(Constant)

Transactions
Payroll

.351
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DV: Operating Income
Model Summary
Model
R
d

i

m

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

1

.051

a

.003

-.033

13.875962

2

.058

b

.003

-.071

14.125706

3

.061

c

.004

-.111

14.391480

.005

-.154

14.667931

.148

-.029

13.849399

4

.070

d

5

.385

e

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

a. Predictors: (Constant), Age
b. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA
c. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS
d. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions
e. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions, Payroll
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DV: Operating Income
Coefficientsa
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients
B

1

(Constant)

3

4

5

Std. Error

t

Beta

39.289

84.013

-.795

2.926

37.429

86.602

Age

-.689

3.077

FA

-.125

.914

36.442

88.692

Age

-.641

3.167

FA

-.123

AS

Sig.
.468

.644

-.272

.788

.432

.669

-.044

-.224

.824

-.027

-.137

.892

.411

.685

-.041

-.202

.841

.931

-.027

-.132

.896

-.158

1.443

-.022

-.109

.914

36.338

90.397

.402

.691

Age

-.603

3.235

-.039

-.186

.854

FA

-.080

.981

-.017

-.081

.936

AS

-.127

1.481

-.017

-.086

.932

Transactions

-.059

.343

-.036

-.171

.866

-56.577

97.061

-.583

.565

Age

2.882

3.512

.186

.821

.420

FA

1.383

1.178

.300

1.174

.252

AS

1.663

1.658

.228

1.003

.326

Transactions

-.278

.342

-.170

-.814

.424

-2.236E-7

.000

-.626

-2.011

.056

Age
2

Standardized Coefficients

(Constant)

(Constant)

(Constant)

(Constant)

Payroll

-.051
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Free-Agent Classes By Year (2006-2009)

2006
PLAYER
Alfonso
Soriano
Barry Zito
Carlos Lee
Aramis
Ramirez
J.D. Drew
Gil Meche
Daisuke
Matsuzaka
Gary
Matthews Jr.

POSITION AGE

STATUS

2006 TEAM

NEW TEAM

YEARS

DOLLARS

Chicago Cubs
San Francisco
Houston

8
7
6

$136,000,000
$126,000,000
$100,000,000

Chicago Cubs
Boston
Kansas City

5
5
5

$75,000,000
$70,000,000
$55,000,000

LF
SP
LF

35 Signed (A)
32 Signed (A)
34 Signed (A)

3B
RF
SP

32 Signed (A)
35 Signed (A)
32 Signed (B)

Washington
Oakland
Texas
Chicago
Cubs
LA Dodgers
Seattle

SP

30 Signed

Japan

Boston

6

$52,000,000

CF

36 Signed (A)

LA Angels

5

$50,000,000

Jason Schmidt

SP

38 Signed (A)

LA Dodgers

3

$47,000,000

Juan Pierre
Jeff Suppan
Ted Lilly
Julio Lugo
Vicente
Padilla
Miguel Batista
Adam Eaton
Mike Mussina

LF
RP
SP
2B

33
36
35
35

Signed (B)
Signed (A)
Signed (B)
Signed

Texas
San
Francisco
Chicago
Cubs
St. Louis
Toronto
LA Dodgers

LA Dodgers
Milwaukee
Chicago Cubs
Boston

5
4
4
4

$44,000,000
$42,000,000
$40,000,000
$36,000,000

SP
SP
SP
SP

33
40
33
42

Signed (B)
Signed (B)
Signed
Signed (A)

Texas
Arizona
Texas
NY Yankees

Texas
Seattle
Philadelphia
NY Yankees

3
3
3
2

$33,750,000
$25,000,000
$24,500,000
$23,000,000
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Jason Marquis
Aubrey Huff
Kei Igawa
Danys Baez
Jim Edmonds
Nomar
Garciaparra
Frank Thomas
Dave Roberts
Justin Speier
Bengie Molina
Andy Pettitte

SP
1B
SP
RP
CF

32
34
31
33
40

Signed
Signed (A)
Signed
Signed (A)
Signed (A)

St. Louis
Houston
Japan
Atlanta
St. Louis

Chicago Cubs
Baltimore
NY Yankees
Baltimore
St. Louis

3
3
5
3
2

$21,000,000
$20,000,000
$20,000,000
$19,000,000
$19,000,000

1B
DH
LF
RP
C
SP

37
42
38
37
36
38

Signed (B)
Signed (B)
Signed (A)
Signed (A)
Signed (A)
Signed

LA Dodgers
Toronto
San Francisco
LA Angels
San Francisco
NY Yankees

2
2
3
4
3
1

$18,500,000
$18,120,000
$18,000,000
$18,000,000
$16,000,000
$16,000,000

Barry Bonds

LF

46 Signed

San Francisco

1

$15,800,000

Ray Durham

2B

39 Signed (A)

LA Dodgers
Oakland
San Diego
Toronto
Toronto
Houston
San
Francisco
San
Francisco

San Francisco

2

$14,000,000
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2007
PLAYER
Alex
Rodriguez
Torii Hunter
Aaron
Rowand
Jorge Posada
Carlos Silva
Francisco
Cordero
Mariano
Rivera
Mike Lowell
Andruw Jones
Jose Guillen
Luis Castillo
Scott
Linebrink
Kazuo Matsui
Andy Pettitte
Geoff Jenkins
David Riske
Octavio Dotel
Eric Gagne
Pedro Feliz
Tom Glavine
Ron Mahay

POSITION AGE

STATUS

2007 TEAM

NEW TEAM

YEARS

DOLLARS

3B
RF

35 Signed
35 Signed (A)

NY Yankees
Minnesota

NY Yankees
LA Angels

CF
DH
SP

33 Signed (A)
39 Signed
31 Signed

Philadelphia
NY Yankees
Minnesota

San Francisco
NY Yankees
Seattle

5
4
4

$60,000,000
$52,400,000
$48,000,000

RP

35 Signed (A)

Milwaukee

Cincinnati

4

$46,000,000

RP
1B
CF
RF
2B

41
37
33
34
35

Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed

NY Yankees
Boston
Atlanta
Seattle
NY Mets

NY Yankees
Boston
LA Dodgers
Kansas City
NY Mets

3
3
2
3
4

$45,000,000
$37,500,000
$36,200,000
$36,000,000
$25,000,000

RP
2B
SP
RF
RP
RP
RP
3B
SP
RP

34
35
38
36
34
37
35
35
45
39

Signed (A)
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed (B)
Signed
Signed (B)
Signed (B)
Signed (A)
Signed (B)

Milwaukee
Colorado
NY Yankees
Milwaukee
Kansas City
Atlanta
Boston
San Francisco
NY Mets
Atlanta

Chicago Sox
Houston
NY Yankees
Philadelphia
Milwaukee
Chicago Sox
Milwaukee
Philadelphia
Atlanta
Kansas City

4
3
1
2
3
2
1
2
1
2

$19,000,000
$16,500,000
$16,000,000
$13,000,000
$13,000,000
$11,000,000
$10,000,000
$8,500,000
$8,000,000
$8,000,000

10 $275,000,000
5
$90,000,000
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Troy Percival
Kenny Rogers
Luis Vizcaino
Yorvit
Torrealba
Mike
Cameron
Keith Foulke
Mike Lamb
Masa
Kobayashi
Milton Bradley

RP
SP
RP

41 Signed (B)
46 Signed
36 Signed

St. Louis
Detroit
NY Yankees

Tampa Bay
Detroit
Colorado

2
1
2

$8,000,000
$8,000,000
$7,500,000

C

32 Signed

Colorado

Colorado

2

$7,250,000

CF
RP
3B

38 Signed (B)
38 Signed
35 Signed

San Diego
Cleveland
Houston

Milwaukee
Oakland
Minnesota

1
1
2

$7,000,000
$7,000,000
$6,600,000

RP
LF

36 Signed
33 Signed

Japan
San Diego

Cleveland
Texas

2
1

$6,500,000
$5,000,000
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2008
PLAYER
Mark Teixeira
CC Sabathia
A.J. Burnett
Derek Lowe
Ryan Dempster
Manny Ramirez
Francisco
Rodriguez
Oliver Perez
Raul Ibanez
Milton Bradley
Rafael Furcal
Kenshin
Kawakami
Kerry Wood
Adam Dunn
Edgar Renteria
Casey Blake
Brian Fuentes
Pat Burrell
Jamie Moyer
Juan Rivera
Damaso Marte
Koji Uehara
Kyle Farnsworth

POSITION AGE
STATUS
1B
31 Signed (A)
SP
30 Signed (A)
SP
34 Signed (A)
SP
37 Signed (A)
SP
33 Signed
DH
38 Signed

2008 TEAM
LA Angels
Milwaukee
Toronto
LA Dodgers
Chicago Cubs
LA Dodgers

NEW TEAM
NY Yankees
NY Yankees
NY Yankees
Atlanta
Chicago Cubs
LA Dodgers

YEARS DOLLARS
8 $180,000,000
7 $161,000,000
5
$82,500,000
4
$60,000,000
4
$52,000,000
2
$45,000,000

RP
SP
LF
LF
SS

29
29
38
33
33

Signed (A)
Signed
Signed (A)
Signed (B)
Signed

LA Angels
NY Mets
Seattle
Texas
LA Dodgers

NY Mets
NY Mets
Philadelphia
Chicago Cubs
LA Dodgers

3
3
3
3
3

$37,000,000
$36,000,000
$31,500,000
$30,000,000
$30,000,000

SP
RP
DH
SS
3B
RP
LF
SP
DH
RP
RP
RP

35
33
31
35
37
35
34
48
32
36
36
35

Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed (A)
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed

Japan
Chicago Cubs
Arizona
Detroit
LA Dodgers
Colorado
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
LA Angels
NY Yankees
Japan
Detroit

Atlanta
Cleveland
Washington
San Francisco
LA Dodgers
LA Angels
Tampa Bay
Philadelphia
LA Angels
NY Yankees
Baltimore
Kansas City

3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
3
3
2
2

$23,000,000
$20,500,000
$20,000,000
$18,500,000
$17,500,000
$17,500,000
$16,000,000
$13,000,000
$12,750,000
$12,000,000
$10,000,000
$9,250,000
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Nick Punto
Jeremy Affeldt
Randy Johnson
Jon Garland
Willy Taveras
Juan Cruz
Trevor Hoffman

3B
RP
SP
SP
CF
RP
RP

33
31
47
31
29
32
43

Signed
Signed (B)
Signed
Signed (B)
Signed
Signed (A)
Signed

Minnesota
Cincinnati
Arizona
LA Angels
Colorado
Arizona
San Diego

Minnesota
San Francisco
San Francisco
Arizona
Cincinnati
Kansas City
Milwaukee

2
2
1
1
2
2
1

$8,500,000
$8,000,000
$8,000,000
$7,250,000
$6,250,000
$6,000,000
$6,000,000
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2009
PLAYER
Matt Holliday
John Lackey
Jason Bay
Chone Figgins
Aroldis
Chapman
Randy Wolf
Placido
Polanco
Joel Pineiro
Mike Cameron
Marlon Byrd
Brandon Lyon
Jason Marquis
Jose Valverde
Marco Scutaro
Mark DeRosa
Mike Gonzalez
Andy Pettitte
Fernando
Rodney
Adrian Beltre
Ben Sheets
Johnny
Damon

POSITION AGE
STATUS
LF
31 Signed
SP
32 Signed (A)
LF
32 Signed (A)
3B
33 Signed (A)

2009 TEAM
St. Louis
LA Angels
Boston
LA Angels

NEW TEAM
St. Louis
Boston
NY Mets
Seattle

YEARS DOLLARS
7 $120,000,000
5
$82,500,000
4
$66,000,000
4
$36,000,000

Cuba
LA Dodgers

Cincinnati
Milwaukee

6
3

$30,250,000
$29,750,000

Detroit
St. Louis
Milwaukee
Texas
Detroit
Colorado
Houston
Toronto
St. Louis
Atlanta
NY Yankees

Philadelphia
LA Angels
Boston
Chicago Cubs
Houston
Washington
Detroit
Boston
San Francisco
Baltimore
NY Yankees

3
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1

$18,000,000
$16,000,000
$15,500,000
$15,000,000
$15,000,000
$15,000,000
$14,000,000
$12,500,000
$12,000,000
$12,000,000
$11,750,000

RP
SP

23 Signed
34 Signed

3B
SP
CF
CF
RP
SP
RP
SS
LF
RP
SP

35
32
38
33
31
32
33
35
36
32
38

RP
3B
SP

34 Signed (B)
32 Signed (B)
32 Signed

Detroit
Seattle
--

LA Angels
Boston
Oakland

2
1
1

$11,000,000
$10,000,000
$10,000,000

DH

37 Signed

NY Yankees

Detroit

1

$8,000,000

Signed
Signed (B)
Signed
Signed (B)
Signed (B)
Signed (B)
Signed (A)
Signed (A)
Signed (B)
Signed (A)
Signed
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Rafael
Betancourt
John Grabow
Rich Harden
LaTroy Hawkins
Brad Penny
Rafael Soriano
Noel Arguelles
Carl Pavano
Billy Wagner

RP
RP
SP
RP
SP
RP
SP
SP
RP

Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
35 Signed
39 Signed (A)

35
32
29
38
32
31

Colorado
Chicago Cubs
Chicago Cubs
Houston
San Francisco
Atlanta
Cuba
Minnesota
Boston

Colorado
Chicago Cubs
Texas
Milwaukee
St. Louis
Tampa Bay
Kansas City
Minnesota
Atlanta

2
2
1
2
1
1
5
1
1

$7,550,000
$7,500,000
$7,500,000
$7,500,000
$7,500,000
$7,250,000
$7,000,000
$7,000,000
$7,000,000

Appendix C
Free-Agent Classes By Year (2006-2009)
Average Spending in Free Agency (20062010)
*in millions of dollars

** All data acquired from ESPN.com

Appendix D
Baseball America Top-100 Prospects, 10 Years Later

Today's Ranking

Rank

BA’s 2001 List

Albert Pujols (42)
Ichiro Suzuki (9)
Roy Oswalt (13)
CC Sabathia (7)
Chase Utley
Miguel Cabrera (91)
Carlos Zambrano
(68)
Jimmy Rollins (31)
Brandon Webb
Hanley Ramirez
Grady Sizemore
Matt Holliday
John Lackey
Adam Dunn (33)
Jake Peavy (40)
Vernon Wells (12)
Carl Crawford (72)
Ted Lilly
Victor Martinez
Mike Young
Ben Sheets (5)
Jose Reyes
Casey Blake
Josh Beckett (3)
Alfonso Soriano (27)
Chone Figgins
Cliff Lee
Brian Roberts
Adrian Gonzalez (89)
David DeJesus
Travis Hafner
David Eckstein
Joe Nathan
Justin Morneau
Mark Ellis
Orlando Hudson
Francisco Rodriguez
(71)
Aaron Rowand

1
2
3
4
5
6

Josh Hamilton (51)
Corey Patterson
Josh Beckett (24)
Jon Rauch
Ben Sheets (21)
Sean Burroughs

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

CC Sabathia (4)
Ryan Anderson
Ichiro Suzuki (2)
Nick Johnson (56)
Carlos Pena (68)
Vernon Wells (16)
Roy Oswalt (3)
Drew Henson
Chin-Hui Tsao
Antonio Perez
Juan Cruz
Alex Escobar
Jerome Williams
Bobby Bradley
R House
Hee Seop Choi
Joe Borchard
Austin Kearns (53)
Chris George
Donnie Bridges
Alfonso Soriano (25)
Matt Belisle
Wilson Betemit
Kurt Ainsworth
Jimmy Rollins (8)
Felipe Lopez
Adam Dunn (14)
Jose Ortiz
Brad Wilkerson (84)
Joe Crede (74)

37
38

Ben Christensen
Jack Cust
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Jason Bay
Brandon Inge (67)
Jayson Werth
Adam Wainwright
(97)
Lyle Overbay
Shin-Soo Choo
Coco Crisp
Aaron Harang
Erik Bedard
Jhonny Peralta
Marcus Giles (54)
Marco Scutaro
Josh Hamilton (1)
Rich Harden
Austin Kearns (24)
Aubrey Huff (43)
Juan Uribe (94)
Nick Johnson (10)
Jack Wilson
Marlon Byrd
Kelly Johnson
Joel Pineiro (80)
Jamey Carroll
Aaron Cook
Shane Victorino
Eric Byrnes
Brett Myers (47)
Jake Westbrook
Dontrelle Willis
Carlos Pena (11)
Freddy Sanchez
Ryan Franklin

39
40
41

Bud Smith
Jacob Peavy (15)
Adam Johnson

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Morgan Ensberg
Scot Shields
Scott Podsednik
Joe Crede (36)
Alexis Rios
James Shields
Brian Fuentes

71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Albert Pujols (1)
Aubrey Huff (54)
Matt Ginter
Wes Anderson
Angelo Jimenez
Brett Myers (65)
Dee Brown
Tim Redding
Joe Torres
Matt McClendon
Jason Standridge
Wascar Serrano
Marcus Giles (49)
Michael Cuddyer
Kevin Mench
Wilfredo Rodriguez
Mike Bynum
Jason Hart
Tony Torcato
Dan Wright
Alex Cintron
Pat Strange
Brian Cole
Jovanny Cedeno
Adrian Hernandez
Brandon Inge (40)
Carlos Zambrano (7)
Jesus Colome
Eric Munson
Francisco Rodriguez
(37)
Carl Crawford (17)
Luis Montanez
Dane Sardinha
Abraham Nunez
Brad Baker
Dernell Stenson
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Josh Willingham
Mike Napoli
Yadier Molina
Chris Young
J.J. Putz
Rafael Betancourt
Brad Wilkerson (35)
Franklin Gutierrez
Corey Hart
Damaso Marte
Garrett Atkins
Maicer Izturis
Brian Schneider
Rafael Soriano
Justin Duchscherer
Jose Valverde
Bobby Jenks
Eric Hinske
Matt Thornton
Angel Pagan
Omar Infante
Hank Blalock
Ryan Ludwick (81)

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Brad Baisley
Mike MacDougal
Joel Pineiro (60)
Ryan Ludwick (100)
Xavier Nady
Nick Neugebauer
Justin Miller
Lance Niekro
Chin-Feng Chen
Tony Blanco
Danys Baez
Adrian Gonzalez (29)
David Espinosa
Miguel Cabrera (6)
Jason Marquis
Luis Rivas
Juan Uribe (55)
Ramon Santiago
Keith Reed
Adam Wainwright (42)
Chris Snelling
Joe Lawrence
Matt White

Appendix E
List of Variables and Values

Team

AllFA/Team Stars

Age

Trans/Team

Payroll

2010 Winning Pct

Op. Income*

Wins

NYY

29.648

14

8

27 206,333,389.00 .586

25.7

95

BOS

29.946

9

6

43 162,447,333.00 .549

-1.1

89

ATL

27.888

11

6

24 84,423,666.00

.562

22.2

91

TEX

27.671

5

6

28 55,250,544.00

.556

22.6

90

STL

28.315

10

5

15 93,540,751.00

.531

19.8

86

LAD

29.463

12

4

42 95,358,016.00

.494

32.8

80

TBR

27.768

5

4

25 71,923,471.00

.593

6.8

96

CIN

29.156

8

4

17 71,761,542.00

.562

20.1

91

PHI

30.667

12

3

30 141,928,379.00 .599

8.9

97

DET

28.865

8

3

14 122,864,928.00 .500

-29.1

81

MIL

28.005

11

3

24 81,108,278.00

.475

12.4

77

TOR

29.882

9

3

36 62,234,000.00

.525

3.6

85

NYM

27.833

17

2

30 134,422,942.00 .488

-6.2

79

CHW

29.625

8

2

16 105,530,000.00 .543

27.6

88

LAA

29.103

8

2

14 104,963,866.00 .494

11.8

80
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SFG

28.715

14

2

22 98,641,333.00

.568

29.9

92

MIN

28.294

6

2

16 97,559,166.00

.580

26.5

94

COL

28.636

9

2

15 84,227,000.00

.512

16.3

83

FLA

27.331

6

2

22 57,034,719.00

.494

20.2

80

OAK

28.235

6

2

31 51,654,900.00

.500

23.2

81

SDP

29.548

6

2

17 37,799,300.00

.556

37.2

90

CHC

29.028

12

1

17 146,609,000.00 .463

23.4

75

HOU

29.789

14

1

37 92,355,500.00

.469

14.4

76

SEA

28.735

9

1

30 86,510,000.00

.377

9.9

61

BAL

28.957

8

1

17 81,612,500.00

.407

25.5

66

KCR

29.006

8

1

30 71,405,210.00

.414

10.3

67

WSN

28.067

12

1

31 61,400,000.00

.426

36.6

69

CLE

28.057

8

1

25 61,203,966.00

.426

12.1

69

ARI

27.804

9

1

22 60,718,166.00

.401

6.2

65

PIT
MLB
Avg

26.99

8

1

34 34,943,000.00

.352

24.6

57

28.701

9

3

25

90,592,162 .500

16.473

81

Appendix E
List of Variables and Values
* in millions of dollars

Appendix F
Top-50 Players by Wins Above Replacement Value

2009

2010

Player
Zack Greinke
Albert Pujols
Ben Zobrist
Justin Verlander
Tim Lincecum
Joe Mauer
Chase Utley
Roy Halladay
Evan Longoria
Hanley Ramirez
Derek Jeter
Prince Fielder
Felix Hernandez
Ryan Zimmerman
Cliff Lee
Javier Vazquez
Adrian Gonzalez
Jon Lester

Team

WAR

Royals

9.4

Cardinals

8.7

Rays

8.4

Tigers

8.3

Giants

8.2

CC Sabathia
Chone Figgins
Dan Haren
Franklin Gutierrez
Kevin Youkilis
Adam Wainwright
Carl Crawford
Troy Tulowitzki
Ubaldo Jimenez
Chris Carpenter
Matt Holliday
Josh Johnson
Miguel Cabrera
Josh Beckett
Mark Teixeira
Pablo Sandoval
Derrek Lee
Matt Kemp
Shin-Soo Choo

Twins

8

Phillies

7.7

Blue Jays

7.3

Rays

7.3

Marlins

7.1

Yankees

7.1

Brewers

6.9

Mariners

6.8

Nationals

6.7

---

6.6

Braves

6.5

Padres

6.5

Red Sox

6.3

Yankees

6.3

Angels

6.1

Diamondbacks

6.1

Mariners

6.1

Red Sox

5.9

Cardinals

5.7

Rays

5.7

Rockies

5.7

Rockies

5.7

Cardinals

5.6

Cardinals*

5.6

Marlins

5.6

Tigers

5.5

Red Sox

5.4

Yankees

5.4

Giants

5.3

Cubs

5.2

Dodgers

5

Indians

5

Player
Josh Hamilton
Joey Votto
Albert Pujols
Ryan Zimmerman
Cliff Lee
Adrian Beltre
Jose Bautista
Evan Longoria
Matt Holliday
Carl Crawford
Roy Halladay
Troy Tulowitzki
Robinson Cano
Justin Verlander
Josh Johnson
Ubaldo Jimenez
Felix Hernandez
Miguel Cabrera
Adam
Wainwright
Rickie Weeks
Francisco Liriano
Andres Torres
Kelly Johnson
Carlos Gonzalez
Jered Weaver
Aubrey Huff
Jon Lester
Shin-Soo Choo
Brett Gardner
Brian McCann
Jay Bruce
Adrian Gonzalez
Zack Greinke
Chase Utley
Tim Lincecum
CC Sabathia
Stephen Drew

Team
Rangers

WAR
8

Reds

7.4

Cardinals

7.3

Nationals

7.2

---

7.1

Red Sox

7.1

Blue Jays

6.9

Rays

6.9

Cardinals

6.9

Rays

6.9

Phillies

6.6

Rockies

6.4

Yankees

6.4

Tigers

6.3

Marlins

6.3

Rockies

6.3

Mariners

6.2

Tigers

6.2

Cardinals

6.1

Brewers

6.1

Twins

6

Giants

6

Diamondbacks

6

Rockies

6

Angels

5.9

Giants

5.7

Red Sox

5.6

Indians

5.6

Yankees

5.4

Braves

5.3

Reds

5.3

Padres

5.3

Royals

5.2

Phillies

5.2

Giants

5.1

Yankees

5.1

Diamondbacks

5.1
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Ichiro Suzuki
Jason Bay
Dustin Pedroia
Ryan Braun
Nyjer Morgan
Jayson Werth
Jason Bartlett
Joel Pineiro
Ryan Howard
J.D. Drew
Ian Kinsler
Justin Upton
Casey Blake
*All data obtained from
fangraphs.com

Mariners

5

Red Sox

5

Red Sox

5

Brewers

4.9

Nationals*

4.9

Phillies

4.9

Rays

4.9

Cardinals

4.8

Phillies

4.8

Red Sox

4.8

Rangers

4.7

Diamondbacks

4.6

Dodgers

4.6

Dan Uggla
Joe Mauer
Scott Rolen
Jayson Werth
Jason Heyward
Angel Pagan
Daric Barton
Clayton Kershaw
Ichiro Suzuki
Roy Oswalt
Yovani Gallardo
Chad Billingsley
Chase Headley

Marlins

5.1

Twins

5.1

Reds

5

Phillies

5

Braves

5

Mets

4.9

Athletics

4.9

Dodgers

4.8

Mariners

4.8

---

4.7

Brewers

4.6

Dodgers

4.6

Padres

4.6
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